Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro

This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well as the Kremlin’s different sources of influence in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis in the context of changing geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s main objectives in the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status on a global scale. Second, it seeks to hinder the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration by opposing NATO and EU integration and fueling instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, particularly the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad.

Instead of building a lasting, comprehensive and meaningful relationship with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Montenegro, Russia is instead pursuing an opportunistic approach dependent on fragmented entry points for its influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions in building positive relations with the three countries, which is also reflected in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It maintains contacts and influence across a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malicious proxy groups, using energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow is deliberately pursuing this approach, which has proven relatively effective.

At the political level, Russia’s influence extends particularly to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often use similar speeches and use Russia as external support to promote their own ideas. In particular, its stance on Kosovo, Russia’s support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik, and its ties to the Orthodox Church remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region. in its entirety. Among these three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most prevalent in Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Economically, Russia’s influence is largely exceeded by that of the EU, particularly in terms of trade. Russia’s considerable influence in the energy sectors of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, however, gives it considerable political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically unviable.

In terms of military influence, Russia seeks to maintain military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while supporting the militarization of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current level of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s fulcrum in the Balkans. In fact, Russia is just one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China.

While presenting itself as a partner of Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also employs malign instruments that have often proven effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organizations, which generally resemble organized crime groups more than paramilitary organizations, to achieve its goal of destabilization by stoking polarization and anti-Western sentiment.

The Kremlin is perhaps the most successful in the area of ​​media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social networks. Russian disinformation and rhetoric have penetrated the region so much that a considerable part of society has a positive image of Russia and its political leaders.

In all of these areas, the Russian invasion of Ukraine moderately, but not completely, affected Russia’s approach to Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Even though the invasion led to a sharper divide between Russia and the West and a decline in Russian financial and diplomatic capabilities, we see continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in all three countries have been moderately tested, including early moves by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia to diversify their energy sources and Western pressure to reduce their political and security ties with the Russian Federation. For now, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries.

The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro will be part of a Clingendael monitoring report to be published in fall 2023. In the As part of the same research project, analyzes of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in the summer of 2023 by Clingendael’s partners, the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for human rights in Serbia and the Atlantic Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Read it full report.