Compared to Turkey’s ambitions as a powerful player in the Middle East, its Balkan policies have been timid and lackluster. The Balkan region should theoretically be one of the main focuses of Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” foreign policy. However, Turkey has a weak presence and inconsistent political allegiances. Ties between Turkey and the Balkan states today are primarily economic and cultural, with only a symbolic political presence. In contrast, Turkish activity in predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and the Caucasus is marked by a willingness to engage politically and militarily in major regional political events such as the Arab Spring and to support Azerbaijan in His efforts. military conflict with Armenia.
Ankara’s lack of political engagement can be explained at least in part by the fact that most Balkan states do not have majority Muslim populations. Christian-majority Balkan states often view Turkey with suspicion due to historical grievances that limit cooperation to economic ties instead of deeper political engagement.
However, this does not explain why Turkey is so conspicuously absent from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania, which have predominantly Muslim populations and have historically been considered as “Ottoman” as the Turks themselves. same. Turkish economic and political presence has increased in these states since Erdoğan came to power. These ties have been mostly symbolic, with Erdoğan supporting political parties that share ideological ties with his AK Party in Turkey. Turkish state investments have mainly focused on the reconstruction of the Ottoman cultural heritage, which was particularly welcomed by the Muslim communities of the region.
However, significant infrastructural or government investments were mostly declaratory and rarely realized. Private investment from Turkey did not appear to have the state support or guidance needed to invest in Muslim-majority Balkan states; on the contrary, Turkish private investments have mainly been directed towards Christian-majority states such as North Macedonia and Serbia. These were perhaps Turkey’s first steps toward engagement in a region it had dominated for centuries, with an eye toward more meaningful engagement in the near future. However, significant strategic and security involvement was visibly absent.
Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman approach is apparently centered on concentrating, seeking and building alliances with conservative or Muslim elements in former Ottoman provinces that are now independent states in their own right. Its strategy is to offer these states a level of protection and economic cooperation which, in turn, would give Turkey decisive influence. Today, only three such states qualify in the Balkans: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Albania. Turkey has contacted conservative and left-wing parties in Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. Bosnia’s largest party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), whose founder is known for his ideological sympathies for the Muslim Brotherhood, has maintained close ties with political ties with the AK party. They see themselves as sister parties with common ideological roots. Erdoğan often visited or was hosted by the SDA leader in the Bosnian capital.
Despite these close ties and other contacts, one cannot escape the conclusion that Turkey lack of strength for major political engagement in the Western Balkans. This lack of significant presence was best illustrated by the tumultuous period following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which prompted the US-EU alliance to become heavily involved in the domestic politics of US states. Western Balkans, particularly Bosnia and Kosovo. As for the Muslim-majority states of the Western Balkans, a clear policy of containment was put in place to preempt Turkish influence in the region.
Given that US policy in the Middle East during the Obama era was largely reactive to Turkish advances, the West’s policy of containment towards Turkey has only recently been extended to the Balkan region. The United States has proactively and visibly outpaced Erdoğan’s Turkey in the Balkans and Aegean regions since the start of the war. Biden administration took office, expanding the containment policies toward Turkey adopted by the Obama administration.
Recently, U.S. officials announcement the construction of a military base in the Greek coastal city of Alexandroupolis, forty kilometers from the Turkish border and the Bosphorus Strait. France also announced a security cooperation agreement with Greece against Turkish ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean region, disagreeing over the extent of the Turkish and Libyan Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) at the expense of the EEZ of Greece and the EU.
Washington has also aggressively entered the political theater of all Western Balkan countries, with activities mostly at odds with Erdoğan’s allies. It is therefore impossible not to envisage a significant entry of Turkish foreign policy into the Balkan region without the contextual background of the Turkish containment policy by the US-EU alliance. This policy could continue until a more favorable regime comes to power after Turkey’s 2028 elections.
US-EU policy in the Balkans became egregious in May 2023, when the SDA was expelled from the government via decrees imposed by the Office of the High Representative. The intention was clear: to push secure The political role of EU member Croatia in implementing, at least temporarily, minority rule through its Croatian co-national minority in Bosnia. The imposed decree was described by the majority Muslim community as “aside “minority government” in a Muslim-majority country. Despite this de facto coup, Turkish officials protested only quietly and visibly left Bosnian politics outside the demands set by Turkey to enable further NATO enlargement.
What happened next in the neighboring Republic of Kosovo confirmed Turkey’s policy of preventive containment. Kosovo – to gain leverage against Serbia’s encroachment on Kosovo’s sovereignty in its Serbian-majority northern regions – recently purchased Bayraktar Drones of Turkey. The move gave Prime Minister Albin Kurti more room to extend the government. control on separatist areas with a Serb majority in the north of the country, supported if not led by neighboring Serbia. However, the Kosovo government’s newfound confidence and independent action did not sit well with U.S. and European officials, culminating in the public statement by the U.S. ambassador to Kosovo. threatening Pristina’s status should be relegated to Palestine at worst and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus at best, a blatant reference to Kosovo’s Muslim-majority status and its ties to Turkey.
The third predominantly Muslim country in the Western Balkans is Albania, whose political leaders have so demonstrated their loyalty to the transatlantic alliance in the Western Balkans that the (non-Muslim) Albanian Prime Minister, Edi Rama, broke the ranks for the first time with Kurti, joining American and European diplomats to denounce Kurti’s attempts to take control of the breakaway region of northern Kosovo.
The US and EU are working to prevent Turkish foreign policy influence in Muslim-majority states surrounded by EU member state borders. A brazen minority government and principles of apartheid Turkey’s establishment in Bosnia and threats of “Palestinization” of Kosovo show, if not a determination to act decisively to prevent an antagonistic Turkey from becoming involved with deeply entrenched states in the European continent and the Western world in general. Simply put, Turkey was beaten head-on.
A possible limitation is geography. Turkey does not have the possibility of direct contact with Bosnia or Kosovo, as the two states do not have coastal access. It should be noted that in the case of Bosnia, a small strip of sovereign coastline does exist; However, the state does not fully control this tiny strip, as evidenced by the 2014 attack on a Turkish navy ship. access denied by the Croatian minority, which de facto controls the only coastal strip of the country. The Turkish navy made no further attempts to dock. On the other hand, Kosovo could compensate for its lack of coastline via Albania, which, at least for now, sits firmly in the US-EU camp.
Turkey’s reaction, if there is one, remains to be seen. One possible option would be for Ankara to financially and politically support parties in Bosnia that are vying for the support of the Muslim majority, including all other allies that the latest US and European policies in Bosnia have disenfranchised. In Kosovo, Turkey can support Kurti by procuring more advanced weaponry to leverage its position by giving Kosovo autonomy for its territorial defense, a burden carried by Western governments through the Kosovo Force mission. Kurti, in turn, would have much more room for maneuver if the country’s defense did not depend on an American or European commitment. In Albania, Turkey could also devote resources to the Rama opposition to bring the security policies of Albania and Kosovo closer together in the spirit of Albanian cooperation. In any case, Turkey can use national and religious grievances to increase its influence.
Perhaps more strategically, Turkey can also foster alliances with non-Muslim majority states, such as North Macedonia and Montenegro, victims of the latest round of US-EU negotiations. Strategies who seek regional détente with an adversary Russia and find themselves without support. Turkey, in this regard, has options. However, Turkey must decide whether or not it wants to enter the Balkan fray. From the start, the alliance between the United States and the European Union made the battle difficult. Now the ball is clearly in Turkey’s court and Erdoğan must decide the game.
Reuf Bajrovic (@reufbajrovic) is vice chair of the United States-Europe Alliance and a member of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
