How to stop Russia’s second front in the Balkans

Recently, the Russians are planning to destabilize and capture Belarus, Moldova and the Baltic countries were disclosed. Likewise, we now know a lot more about the situation in Russia. initial plans to invade and take over Ukraine.

It is therefore indisputable that Russia has been at war with its neighbors, albeit in a non-kinetic manner, for several years. It is just as likely that similar plans and strategies exist to overthrow and destabilize Balkan states outside of Moldova. In 2016, for example, Moscow attempted coups in both countries. Montenegro and Bulgaria. And there, for Moscow, the real reward would be Serbia, where it has long established several beachheads of influence in the media, energy and defense sectorsas well as in Serbian and Bosnian Serb politics more generally.

In most, if not all, of these cases, the strategy included measures to secure niches in these aforementioned sectors while simultaneously exploiting every conceivable ethnic, social, political and religious divide in the Balkan countries – not just Serbia. . At the same time, Moscow agents charged with this mission organized large mass movements that could take to the streets to push for the overthrow of the regime, often due to a crisis generated by Moscow.

Thus, in February, Ukrainian intelligence revealed to Moldova the existence of such a terrain overthrow his government and establish a pro-Moscow regime which would then threaten Ukraine from the southwest. Not only did locally recruited pro-Moscow forces generate this threat, but mercenaries from the notorious Russian forces Wagner Private Army — acting as orchestrator of the insurrection — also participated directly in this operation, as was the case in Africa Also.

A similar scheme could have been planned for Serbia. According to Serbian media, these groups provide new recruits with combat training in a style similar to that of the Sudoplatov Battalion (named after a notorious Stalin-era KGB assassin and agent) currently fighting in Zaporizhzhia. Beyond that, in Serbia, Wagner has clearly taken his operations even further. He created and supported far-right groups — “The People’s Patrol” and the “Orlovi Russian-Serbian Center” — to destabilize Serbian politics. These groups then Pro-Russian Serbs mobilized to launch major protests against Serbia and improving its ties with Kosovo. Serbian police stopped several armed demonstrators who demanded the violent overthrow of the government.

If we consider these facts in the context of attempted coups in Moldova and Bulgaria, it becomes clear that these attempts are orchestrated by Moscow with the support of local proxies. Furthermore, this is obviously part of Moscow’s overall strategy to open a “second front” in Europe.

Destabilizing Balkan governments and replacing them with pro-Russian clients would allow Moscow to achieve many goals. This would stop the process of European integration within NATO and the European Union. It would also allow Russia to better control the Black Sea and energy policy in the Balkans, and thus Central Europe, by allowing Russia to establish naval or other bases in or around the Adriatic Sea and the Mediterranean. It would also create a second front against Ukraine, threatening it militarily from the rear, blocking its ability to move its grain overland across the Balkans and blocking many Western supply routes to it.

In other words, Russian-backed coups in the Balkans would upend the entire transatlantic security agenda.

In Moldova, Russian plans failed because Ukraine got wind of it and informed the government so it could act. But the weakness of this state makes it perpetually vulnerable to these threats. In Serbia, on the other hand, President Aleksandar Vucic has apparently taken steps to block these efforts and preserve the balance in which Serbia oscillates between East and West by taking actions military exercises with NATO. Therefore, Western efforts to integrate the Balkans must continue to strengthen and reward progress toward democratic governance, ending Serbian-Kosovar conflicts and promoting economic development. Pro-Western elements must be encouraged, not neglected, and the region as a whole must regain its priority status in Western politics.

So far, Vucic’s Serbia has not only resisted the Russian challenge, but President Vucic has so far demonstrated that he will not play Moscow’s game. He re-engaged Serbia to possible accession to the EU. During a meeting with American ambassadorsVucic agreed on the importance of supporting the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the multi-ethnic character of the state and functional institutions at the state level, as stipulated by law. 1995 Dayton Accord. This was a direct rejection of Moscow and its Bosnian Serb client, Milorad Dodik, who supported the idea of ​​a secede of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Not only has Vucic reestablished dialogue with Kosovo, despite the difficulties encountered, but he is also moving them forward. For example, Kosovo and Serbia now have agreed to cooperate in resolving cases of missing persons during the 1998-99 war. This is clearly linked to his desire to maintain and develop economic ties with the United States Likewise, Russia’s economic presence in Serbia is in decline regularly due to Western sanctions and Serbia is now seeking to diversify its energy suppliers. Finally, Vucic declared that all Serbs recruited by Wagner will be arrested on the way back.

However, current advances under Moscow’s control and pervasive ethnic tensions in Bosnia and Kosovo also put that country at risk. Thus, Western governments must work with Serbia and its neighbors to strengthen their states. At the same time, they must work together to put out the fires of ethnic tension that provide an opening for Moscow. They must also design a reliable alternative to Russian energy and build an operational and reliable system. energy infrastructure network strengthen Balkan economies and deprive Moscow of its excessive influence over Balkan governments and societies.

In other words, the need to integrate the Balkans has become, if not more, urgent. Since this integration can only be achieved through existing governments, Western institutions must work in concert with them to strengthen both their democratic capacities and their effectiveness, otherwise this second front would not materialize.

If this were to happen, the war in Ukraine will not only become more difficult to win, but it will also turn into a full-blown European conflict. And that is unacceptable.

Stephen Blank, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). He is a former professor of Russian national security studies and national security affairs at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the US Army War College and a former MacArthur Fellow at the US Army War College. Blank is an independent consultant specializing in the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia.