On September 24, armed Serbian paramilitaries ambushed a police patrol near the village of Banjska in northern Kosovo, killing a police officer. The gunmen then fled to a monastery near the Kosovo-Serbia border, where police forces engaged in a firefight with them. Three armed Serbs were killed; the others were arrested or managed to escape. It is one of the worst episodes of violence the country has seen since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999.
In the aftermath of the incident, Belgrade and Pristina exchanged responsibilities. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said the Kosovo government’s “terror” had pushed the country’s northern Serb minority into an “uprising.” Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti has accused Serbia of financially and logistically supporting “organized crime” groups attacking his country – something Belgrade has denied.
On September 29, White House spokesman John Kirby said Serbia was massing unprecedented numbers of forces on the border. With 4,500 NATO troops stationed in Kosovo as part of the KFOR peacekeeping mission, the threat of military confrontation with the West as well as Kosovo might have seemed real. But there was no further escalation.
After a phone call with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Vucic announced that he had called on some troops to withdraw from the border.
The incident did not spark armed conflict, but it revealed some important realities. First, Belgrade continues to use the Kosovo issue to divert attention from domestic problems; second, Vucic could lose control of his Serbian allies in northern Kosovo; and third, the momentum of negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia has been lost, which could lead to further flare-ups of tensions.
Vucic’s domestic problems
In recent months, the Serbian president and his cabinet, dominated by his Serbian Progressive Party, have faced growing public discontent. Two mass shootings in Serbia sparked weekly anti-government protests.
Public anger has focused on the country’s large security apparatus, which was powerless to prevent a mass shooting in the very heart of the Serbian capital, and on media loyal to Vucic who have fostered the cult of gratuitous violence.
The protesters demanded the resignation of the Interior Ministry, the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA), the media regulator and two pro-government television channels, Pink and Happy. Demands have also been made for early elections.
Facing growing pressure, Vucic indicated there could be snap elections for parliament and local councils in December.
The Kosovo incident was a welcome diversion for the president. Shifting the domestic debate to the fate of the Serbs in northern Kosovo and showing strength is his trademark political survival strategy. This was not the first time he pretended to go to war to protect the Serbs. Chances are it won’t be the last either.
Confronting Pristina indeed has great political capital in Serbia. The enthusiastic rhetoric of Serbian nationalist media pushes Serbia to attack and “reconquer” Kosovo. Some members of Serbian society entertain this idea, especially since they perceive the West to be in decline, while Belgrade – it seems – enjoys the support of superpowers like Russia and China.
Belgrade loses control of Kosovo Serb proxies
Although domestically the escalation may have helped Vucic improve his political fortunes, his grip on the politics of the Serb-dominated northern region of Kosovo could be in jeopardy.
Over the years, the Serbian president has managed to take control of local leaders believed to be linked to smuggling and organized crime. The policies of Srpska Lista (Serb List, SL), the main party in the four northern municipalities where Serbs are in the majority – Mitrovica, Zvecan (where Banjska is located), Leposavic and Zubin Potok – have been largely in line with those of Belgrade .
But on Friday, SL vice-president Milan Radoicic, sanctioned by the United States and wanted in Kosovo, admitted responsibility for the impasse, saying Belgrade had nothing to do with it.
If true, it would imply that Vucic cannot control his allies on the ground, which of course raises questions about the EU’s policy of relying on the Serbian president to keep the situation in Kosovo under control .
Radoicic’s admission could also have been made under pressure from Belgrade: Vucic asking his local Serbian acolytes to admit their mistake and absolve him of some of their responsibility.
However, Kurti and Kosovo Interior Minister Xhelal Svecla – who initially showed footage of Radoicic’s presence at the monastery during the clashes – stressed that only the Serbian army could have provided the heavy weapons and uniforms attackers involved in the incident.
Regardless, Belgrade’s reputation has been tarnished. It can be assumed that relations between Vucic and Serb paramilitaries, leaders and nationalist groups in northern Kosovo are becoming increasingly difficult. In the worst case, this could lead to even more unpredictable actions by Kosovo Serb leaders.
Gloomy outlook for negotiations
After all this bluster in favor of domestic consumption, Vucic had to defuse the situation, because he found himself in a difficult situation. The Banjska shooting left him feeling like he had hampered Western efforts to find a settlement to the conflict with Kosovo. This could be bad news for him, because if he was the problem rather than the solution, there is no reason for the West to give him time on other key issues, such as Serbia’s reluctance to join the sanctions against Russia.
Previously, the EU and the United States had criticized Kurti for being the toughest and sabotaging the so-called normalization talks led by the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy, Josep Borrell. Brussels has even implemented sanctions against Pristina. But today, it is Serbia which appears to be the culprit.
Kurti, of course, took the opportunity to elaborate on this point. He denounces Belgrade’s misdeeds daily on social networks. In Kosovo, he has doubled down on his rhetoric that he defends law and order – as well as the country’s sovereignty in the north. The incident – although it raises dark prospects of violence in the north – appears to have worked in Pristina’s favor.
This state of affairs complicates Western efforts to achieve a resolution to the Kosovo issue. The project is clear and has been since 2013: de facto recognition of the independence of Kosovo by Serbia in exchange for the autonomy of the Serbian minority within the Association of Serbian Municipalities (ASM).
But the latest round of talks between leaders in Brussels came to nothing and the agreements in principle reached in February-March have still not been signed. Kosovo wants recognition first. Serbia would prefer that ASM be carried out first.
To break the deadlock, the EU and the United States will likely have to step up diplomatic efforts to reach a compromise. But since the summer of 2022, recurring crises like the one around the Banjska monastery have put obstacles in the way. At first glance, the path ahead will be equally, if not more, daunting; there will be other future pushes and strains along the way.
