Bulgarian policy in the Balkans in 2023

In the first part of our conversation with Professor Zdravko Popov, dedicated to Bulgaria’s relations with the Balkan countries in 2023, he commented on the relations between Bulgaria and its northern neighbor Romania. He cited ongoing logistical problems along the border due to increased traffic resulting from Russian aggression in Ukraine. The former career diplomat, now a lecturer at Sofia University, described the Bulgarian-Turkish good neighborliness as geopolitically predestined.

As we continue our virtual journey through the Balkans from north to south, the conversation takes us to Greece. Bulgarian-Greek relations in 2023 were defined in Sofia and Athens as an example of strategic partnership.

Professor Popov commented on the project under discussion between Bulgaria, Greece and Romania to build a transport corridor from Thessaloniki via the Via Egnatia and along the Black Sea to the ports of Burgas, Varna and Constanta. He disagrees with the idea that this is an unnecessary route that would make the part of Pan-European Corridor 8 running from the Black Sea through northern Macedonia to the Albanian port of Durres.

Corridor 8 must be built because it is a very clearly structured European project. But above all this requires cooperation between the Balkan countries concerned, whose interests must really coincide. There is serious diplomatic work to be done.

From the still unfinished Corridor 8, the discussion on Bulgaria’s Balkan policy reaches North Macedonia. According to Professor Popov, Skopje’s refusal to grant constitutional recognition to the Bulgarian minority will pose a heavy burden for North Macedonia.

On the one hand, Skopje gets the door open to European membership; on the other hand, we have reduced the pressure on them, to the extent that some of our demands have become conditions for European membership, with the intention and desire that North Macedonia finds the right path to achieve its great hope of becoming a member of the EU, and thus paving the way for Albania’s accession to the EU. Because North Macedonia’s internal problems affect neighboring Albania, the Balkans and Europe. Perhaps Tirana and Brussels’ patience will eventually run out, and it would not be surprising if the EU changes its approach and removes Macedonia from the two countries’ enlargement package, leaving Albania to fend for itself alone in the negotiation process. Macedonians need to think seriously about this. They may be stubborn towards the Bulgarian community, but this stubbornness could be a stumbling block for their future in the EU.

Comparing Serbia and North Macedonia’s paths to the EU, analyst says Brussels and Washington are desperately seeking a formula to accelerate the integration of the Western Balkans into the EUtaking into account the geopolitical vectors in the world, in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

“The United States has made the Balkans a foreign policy priority in recent years, and this has been strongly felt in our countries.

The main foreign policy interest of the United States in the Balkans is related to security. Therefore, this security issue cannot stop with a U-turn, but only with NATO membership. Because yes, most countries, with the exception of Serbia and Bosnia, are already members of NATO. But the other part of the U-turn must also be done. In other words, integration should be truly continental in all other directions as well.

This is why the search for a new political configuration in North Macedonia is accelerating, which could lead the political elite in Skopje to regroup and adopt a faster and more commercial approach to integration.

Whoever is in power in Belgrade will have to take into account the divided Serbian society in terms of Serbia’s European integration, underlines the professor. Zdravko Popov. There is an increasingly influential group of pro-European citizens. But public opinion is dominated by a nationalist community oriented towards Russia and pan-Slavism. President Aleksandar Vucic will have to appease both sides of his society, the professor believes in his analysis of the situation in the Balkans in 2023:

“He must declare that Serbia is seeking its European perspective for future EU membership and at the same time convince the other part of public opinion that he is on his side. Then there is the Kosovo problem. Whatever political configuration presents itself in Belgrade, they will have to play this complicated game. They cannot take sides, because we have already seen with Milosevic what happens when the leader takes sides. However, it is now clear that this model of joining the EU through the guarantee of NATO membership is not working for Serbia. All our countries (former communists – editor’s note) which were accepted into the EU had to first go through NATO membership. That was the formula – security first, then the economy, democracy and all sorts of other things. This cannot happen in Serbia. Even pro-European circles cannot forget the war and NATO bombing in the region, so Serbia is a complicated case. A different approach must be found. Perhaps the new European Commission, after next year’s elections, will do so. find it. I think it is unlikely that Brussels will ever abandon Serbia’s integration into Europe.

Asked about the place of the Bulgarian minority in Serbia in the context of the vision of a “Serbian world” in the Balkans, Professor Popov replied that the recognized Bulgarian minority in eastern Serbia (the former western regions of Bulgaria ceded to Yugoslavia) should be protected on an intergovernmental basis in order to create a a level playing field.

Photos: BTA, BGNES, archives

Translated and published by Elizabeth Radkova