Moscow reaches the region’s population mainly through political proxies, local media and the Orthodox Church, all of which strive to exploit divisive issues and deepen existing divides in different societies. Alleged threats posed by NATO enlargement, EU reforms and “Muslim extremists” in Bosnia and Kosovo are often exaggerated and manipulated by Moscow to exacerbate tensions and create a sense of insecurity within of the general population.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is perhaps the clearest example of a country in which there are deep Russian tentacles. Moscow has many pressure points to exploit in a country that has long been caught between pursuing greater integration with the European Union and NATO, on the one hand, and, on the other, elements Radical Serbian nationalist politicians within the party. Republika Srpska (one of the two autonomous entities that make up Bosnia; the other being the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) which keep the country under the influence of Belgrade and Moscow. Moscow benefits from a range of local assets, including high-ranking Serbian nationalist politicians such as Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska. There are also motorcycle gangs like the local Night Wolves chapter, paramilitary militias like Serbian Honor, obscure businessmenthe pro-Russian media and – above all – the transnational Serbian Orthodox Church.
Russia’s main soft power narratives boil down to two elements: anti-Western opposition and civilizational opposition. Orthodox Brotherhood. The speech of the Russian Orthodox Church against the West “moral decadence” (adopted verbatim by the Serbian Orthodox Church) allows Moscow to describe the process of European integration as a new example of normative Western imperialism, seeking to impose foreign liberal values on local societies (which would have more in common with the Eastern Orthodoxy than with Eastern Orthodoxy). with the West). A key part of this technique is to blame current intercommunal tensions on Western hostile actions and ignorance, and to create the impression that Russia is only reacting to Western aggression. Thus, Russia exploits not only the region’s religious and ethnic vulnerabilities, but also the declining trust in democracy and lack of willingness for liberal democratic reforms that have plagued the Balkans after a decade of stagnation.
Balkan responses to the invasion of Ukraine
Just as the Balkan nations have different cultures, ethnicities and political histories, their reactions to the invasion of Ukraine have also been very different. Some were clearly repelled by Russia’s invasion of a sovereign democratic country, including the Croats, Bosnians and Kosovars who are able to identify with the plight of the Ukrainians because of their own similar experience facing the irredentist aspirations of Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s. They anxiously contemplate the possible geopolitical repercussions and rightly wonder what what this could mean for their political future. Others have openly expressed support for President Vladimir Putin and his war against Ukraine, such as Dodik and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. In the case of Serbia, despite Vučić’s policy of “sitting on two chairs” between Moscow and Brussels, a large number of ordinary Serbs support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, particularly in huge street demonstrations where Putin and the Russian army were lionized.
Curling favor with these Balkan leaders is in the interests of the Russian Federation and Putin. Through energy and business investments, the Kremlin has managed to establish a vital source of financing and shown itself capable of expanding its influence in a relatively short period of time. Well connected kleptocratic circles in the Balkans view the connection with Russia as very lucrative, in the same way they view Chinese investments. So Putin’s oligarchs and kleptocratic Balkan nationalists appear to be on the winning team.
Looking at Eastern Europe from a broader perspective, parallels with Russian threats against Bosnia and Ukraine are unfailingly strange. Bosnia and Herzegovina clearly lies in a region where NATO and Russian interests intersect. Although the West recognizes some of the potential benefits associated with Bosnia’s NATO membership, it appears disinclined to actively prevent the country from falling into Kremlin-induced disarray. For example, if the Russian-backed Bosnian Serbs declare independence, a small, unrecognized pro-Russian state, similar to that of Abkhazia, will be formed on the borders of two NATO member states, Croatia. and Montenegro. If Bosnia spins out of control, it would be a very pernicious illusion to think that the rest of the region will remain stable. Time and again, Moscow has demonstrated that the Balkans provide an environment conducive to fighting back against the United States and the EU.
Countering the Kremlin
From Moscow’s perspective, projecting power in the Balkans is tantamount to giving the West a taste of its own medicine. If Europeans and Americans interfere in its “backyard” – Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia or any other part of its “near abroad” – Russia believes it has the right to do the same in theirs. There are, however, several courses of action that could mitigate the trajectory of Russian influence in the Balkans if implemented quickly and vigorously.
Above all, Europe and the United States must strengthen and support a strong and responsive security architecture in Bosnia, Kosovo and Montenegro – the soft and vulnerable underbelly of the region in the sense that these countries offer Moscow countless entry points to exert malign influence. It is essential to encourage the strengthening of institutions and military capabilities at the state level in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is both pro-NATO and pro-EU. In the absence of a strong, stabilizing military footprint, Republika Srpska could draw all of Bosnia even further into the orbit of Belgrade and, ultimately, Moscow.
Second, Russian disinformation campaigns in local languages of the Western Balkans fuel political and ethnic divisions, stoking distrust and instability. We must learn lessons from the Baltic countries which have developed effective methods of combating disinformation. To this end, Bosnia’s partners in Europe and Washington should help facilitate coordinated efforts between private technology companies, social media platforms and government agencies in the Western Balkans. It would also be very useful to strengthen training programs for journalists in the Balkans to raise awareness and make them more capable of combating disinformation and fake news.
Finally, one of the main sources of political instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina is its constitution. Although initially envisioned and adopted as part of a much-needed peace deal in the mid-1990s, all parties agree that it needs to be revamped. The international community – with Europe and the United States in the lead – should once again encourage all relevant actors to start working on a new constitution that could ultimately benefit all citizens and through respect for civil liberties, public freedoms and strong anti-corruption mechanisms. A new Bosnian constitution must reflect the desires of all citizens, with every individual vote counting equally and free of the ethnic quotas and veto provisions that have hampered effective governance for far too long.
Sustainable governance arrangements for Bosnia and a fair settlement to the equally untenable situation in Kosovo provide prime examples of persistent post-conflict issues where renewed attention and investment from Europe and the United States could yield a double dividend: firstly by providing much-needed democracy and stability. to the countries in question, and second, by reducing Moscow’s ability to leverage unresolved Balkan conflicts for strategic purposes.
Dr. Harun Karčić is a Sarajevo-based journalist and political analyst covering the Balkans.
