Alexandra de Hoop SchefferSenior Vice President, Geostrategy, GMF
There is nothing new in Macron’s remarks. There is indeed consistency in what he says. He has repeatedly defended the need for Europe to define an exit strategy from its “in-between” in the competition between the United States and China. Macron seeks European “strategic autonomy,” or the EU’s ability to define and defend its interests and values. He believes that this is the only way to avoid European strategic irrelevance and has even proposed his own definition of the concept: “Strategic autonomy means having convergent views with the United States, but whether on the Ukraine, the relationship with China or the sanctions, we have a European Strategy.
France seeks this convergence with the United States when possible but favors a European strategy when interests diverge, particularly when American policy does not take European interests into account. Washington has recently given several examples of this with the Inflation Reduction Act, the creation of AUKUS and the CHIPS Act. However, Macron’s comments reveal the harsh reality: Europeans have not sufficiently defined their geopolitical strategy and are therefore tempted to follow US policy without thinking about the potential ramifications for themselves. Macron is also thinking about the 2024 US elections and the potential need for Europe to prepare for a tougher relationship with Washington.
France is not seeking equidistance between Beijing and Washington. China is a major subject of Franco-American strategic conversations and dialogues, whether at the bilateral level, at the G7, or even during NATO consultations on cybersecurity, Russia and space. The way Macron framed his remarks on Taiwan was ill-timed, however, amid ongoing Chinese military exercises across the Taiwan Strait. France’s (and Europe’s) objective is to prevent a military escalation in the strait. France supports the status quo, which it reaffirmed before speaking with US President Joe Biden, and maintains exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan. Macron also made it clear to Chinese President Xi Jinping during his trip that the Taiwan issue must be addressed through dialogue. GMFs Transatlantic trends 2022 The survey showed support for this approach. American or European public opinion was not inclined towards military action. Respondents supported diplomatic initiatives and sanctions.
French interest in Taiwan is certainly not lacking. France is the only EU country to regularly patrol the South China Sea and in particular the Taiwan Strait. France and Europe are committed to reducing risks rather than decoupling from China. It is not a question of severing ties with the world’s second largest economy. Washington should also realize the cost. Despite tensions between the United States and China, Sino-American trade has reached record levels ($690 billion in 2022, with an increase in imports and exports). The challenge is to find the right balance between trade and geopolitics.
Macron should talk less and devote more time to behind-the-scenes diplomacy and consultation with his European partners. Speaking in the name of Europe without prior consultation and without proposing concepts to test reactions or provoke debate is useless and destabilizing for the allies. The “Macron method” is dysfunctional and overshadows most recent developments in European policies. Europe has strengthened its economic and geopolitical toolbox over the past five years with the European Chips Act, the net zero strategy, the Critical Raw Materials Act, investment screening mechanisms and the European Peace Facility . These are important steps for the future of Europe and that of the transatlantic relationship.
