The geopolitical impulse behind further EU enlargement faces formidable forces of inertia.
Russia invasion of Ukraine brought enlargement back on the agenda of the European Union, this time as geopolitical imperative. This pushed the European Council in June last year to grant Ukraine And Moldova candidate status while recognizing Georgia’s eligibility for membership and supporting accelerated accession in the Western Balkans.
Since 2004 and the “big bang” of opening to the East, enlargement has lost credibility, with Croatia being the last country to become a full member ten years ago. Its shortcomings include both a technical and rather a political management orientation. Few see enlargement as a realistic prospect in the near future, even for candidate countries.
The French Minister for Europe, Laurence Boone, suggested last month, that a “differentiated” accession process could quickly “anchor” candidate countries to the EU, in accordance with the project put forward by French President Emmanuel Macron for a European political community. And on the eve of the second EPC summit, organized last week in Moldova and in the presence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Macron said the inclusion of the two countries should take place “as quickly as possible”. Yet his approach cuts both ways.
In his Sorbonne speech In 2017, on the future of Europe, Macron said of the Union’s internal differentiation: “No state should be excluded from the process, but no country should be able to block those who want to progress faster or go further. » Within his vision of a Europe of concentric circles, it could thus put a brake on accession negotiations with peripheral North Macedonia and Albania in 2019, unilaterally reconceptualizing the enlargement instrument.
Recurring obstacles
The legacies of war and attempts to coordinate EU foreign and neighborhood policy have left their traces in the Western Balkans. Recurring obstacles, like Bulgaria recently spat on history with North Macedonia and tensions between Belgrade and Pristina in northern Kosovo, blur the EU’s vision for the region. These challenges remain to be met practice in the case of Ukraine, taking into account all historical, religious and cultural factors in the background, as well as the neighboring countries involved.
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The ability to make common decisions on foreign and defense policy, in particular, remains a major concern within the EU, even if the old Cold War fault line was crossed with the 2004 accessions The waves of hope that swelled after 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe transformed into currents of Euroscepticism and nationalism. This is another challenge to make the enlargements of Ukraine and the Western Balkans a vital long-term strategic interest for the EU.
The expectations of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, for whom “Europe” (Western) was a harbinger of freedom, democracy and liberalization, were linked to the association and stabilization agreements between the EU and the candidate Member States in the Western Balkans and the partnership agreements under the European Neighborhood Policyy also introduced in 2004. The ENP aimed to foster stability, security and prosperity in the EU’s neighboring regions to the south and east, as well as cooperation on economic development, security, migration and mobility. Yet, almost two decades later, the EU still struggles to offer its neighbors a coherent migration policy or a comprehensive economic model, beyond the technocratic management of expectations.
Important lessons
As a tool to safeguard the geopolitical interests of European democracies and the security of their citizens, enlargement would be best enhanced by sharing knowledge and practices acquired in its previous iterations. Central and Eastern European member states can offer important lessons for managing the complexities of the situation. Community acquis and meet the Copenhagen criteria for membership.
One of the main challenges, however, will be to overcome the “fear of diversity” and the “deep desire for homogeneity”, as historian Patrick Pasture has highlighted. Put the. An important element, as he did note, was and remains how Europe interacts with “others” and how “others” perceive Europe as an outcome. Ideas of ‘Fortress Europe‘ and of ‘European civilization“, associated with a specific way of telling the story, neglect this interconnection with others.
After 1989, a complacent EU effectively set aside critical reflection on the collective construction of this “an ever closer union“, mainly due to the elite-led integration process and the emphasis on completing the single market. With citizens removed from active political representation through political parties and passive voices channeled primarily through elections and opinion polls, there is little room left to imagine the type of societies citizens would like to build in the future. The exercise of power in small circles, beyond public control, allegedly motivated by “efficiency”, creates a constant mode of governance of crisis management and ad hoc adaptation.
Share responsibility
Candidate Member States must share their responsibilities. The struggles to prove their democratic capabilities and remedy the many shortcomings of judicial systems and autocratic regimes, Euroscepticism and populism, are linked to an irresponsible use of power. Members of the political elites who enjoyed accelerating their careers as negotiators with the European Commission created an exceptional style, beyond the reach of ordinary citizens or public debates. Small teams of civil servants and experts, backed by considerable administrative support, preferred the technocratic way of doing politics rather than expressing the historical and cultural heritage of their states – except when it came to lustration to purge the communist past.
Lessons from the past can certainly offer perspective on the contemporary challenges of enlargement. The candidate country status of Ukraine and Moldova does indeed constitute a burden for the future of the EU peace project. The fanfare for membership, very powerful in times of war and empathetic emotion, can lose its volume over time. Behind the Union’s guarded borders, if lessons from the past are not learned, EU strategies will remain locked in the gap between diplomatic rhetoric and concrete actions in the years to come.