When French President Emmanuel Macron first spoke of a “European political community» (EPC) in May 2022, the proposal was initially greeted with skepticism in many places. In particular, the six Western Balkan states (WB6) – some of which have been working, albeit at different paces, towards EU membership for almost 20 years – were concerned that the EPC would serve as a substitute for a full membership of the EU. Other voices criticized the discussion format, which features no founding documents, as simply an ineffective photo op.
However, after two summits – in Prague in October 2022 and in Chişinau in June 2023 – initial skepticism fades. Many diplomats agree on the lack of a pan-European dialogue format at the highest levels of government, particularly in light of the contentious security environment that has evolved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Summits without hierarchical structures can foster a sense of belonging. The focus on issues such as energy, security and connectivity underlines the approach of working on global issues that affect both EU members and third countries. WB6 should therefore use this new forum as proactively as possible, for example by hosting the summit after Spain and the UK or by chairing a thematic workstream.
Benefits of an agile structure
Currently, the EPC has 47 participants and is characterized by the following characteristics: an agile structure that allows one-off participation in summits and does not involve an institutional structure; no concrete results such as declarations or joint declarations; a rotating presidency which until now alternated between EU countries and third countries; and summits which must be held twice a year in the presiding country.
In the meantime, despite the fluidity of the structure, certain organizational structures have emerged. On the one hand, summits allow sufficient time for bilateral or minilateral meetings. For example, at the Chişinău summit, President Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and EU Council President Charles Michel met with representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Kosovo and Serbia . The added value of diplomatic efforts and exchanges between hostile neighbors in a European context cannot be overemphasized.
In addition, there are working groups that deal with topics of particular importance to the TPR and each is chaired by two countries. In Chişinău, for example, Poland and the United Kingdom took over the “Security” work stream; Norway and Belgium the “Energy” workstream; and Moldova and Spain the “Connectivity” workstream. The topics are prepared in advance by the respective chiefs of staff (“sherpas”). The presiding country may add new topics to the agenda before the summit. Looking at the areas of work, we notice on the one hand that an EU Member State always cooperates with a non-EU Member State on an equal footing and that synergies well beyond the EU agenda can be leveraged through this cooperation. On the other hand, no WB6 country has so far resumed an operational component.
Added value of the EPC for the Western Balkans
The cooperation of one of the BM6s with a major EU partner like Germany or France would be an important step symbolically and practically. Not only would Germany show increased political interest in the Western Balkans in times of geopolitical competition with Russia and China, among others, as in the case of the Western Balkans. relaunch of the Berlin process in autumn 2022. This would also open the possibility for the relevant Western Balkan countries to work constructively and with increased visibility in the European context. High-level cooperation through co-chairing of a working group by a WB and an EU country would also eliminate the hierarchical differences inherent in the enlargement process and enable collaboration on an equal footing.
For example, at the next summit in Granada, Spain, in October, Montenegro and France could co-chair the security working group. After the recent change of power to a pro-European and openly reformist leadership, Montenegro should seize the opportunity to advance security issues within the EPC. As a NATO member, it could use the platform to work on specific cybersecurity issues. At the same time, it would highlight the work of “Cybersecurity Capacity Building Center» in Podgorica, created in November 2022 by France, Montenegro and Slovenia.
Likewise, it would be relevant for North Macedonia to co-chair with Germany a new workstream on migration, especially as the United Kingdom is expected to put this topic on the agenda in spring 2024. As an important crossroads for migration of all kinds, North Macedonia works with Frontex on a joint operation to secure European borders since April 2023. The country should therefore also emphasize its role as the EU’s security partner within the EPC.
Hosting a summit could also represent potential added value for a Western Balkan country. This can bring concrete benefits beyond symbolism. For example, Moldova’s ambassador to Brussels, Daniela Morari, concluded that organizing the Chişinău summit involved a steep learning curve, but also provided significant international support. This gave the country the opportunity to present itself in a positive light on the international stage and initiate critical processes for the country.
Despite all the possibilities for cooperation offered by the EPC, the EU must continue to communicate clearly that the EPC is not a substitute for enlargement. Given in particular the stagnation of the enlargement process, which is linked not only to the absence of reforms within the BM6 but also to the weariness of certain EU members with regard to enlargement, the The EU should not give the impression that the BM6 should remain in the shadows forever. The EU waiting room.
