The European Union and the United States pursue four main foreign policy objectives in their relations with Serbia: containing Russia, containing China, normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo, and protecting the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, for many years they have had little success in any of these areas. There are several reasons for this, some within Serbia and others in Western capitals. EU and US policymakers could change this dynamic, but it seems unlikely that they will do so.
Western governments systematically view Belgrade as the indispensable actor on major issues facing the Western Balkans. Whatever the issue at hand, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic is the first person they call. This is partly understandable: power in Serbia is concentrated in the hands of Vucic, who has gained considerable control. And by all accounts, Serbia is the strongest country in the region. He has enough political and financial influence over unruly Serb politicians in Bosnia, northern Kosovo and Montenegro to rein them in when they cause trouble.
Yet the record of Western governments is slim. Serbia has so far refused to participate in all rounds of EU sanctions against Russia and shows no signs of changing course So. As an EU candidate country, Serbia is supposed to align with the bloc’s foreign policy positions – but its recent compliance in this area fell to just 45 percentagainst 64% in 2020. China’s influence in Serbia grew up rather than diminished, whether measured by investmentthe Chinese presence in the country’s critical infrastructure, or political and cultural ties. Serbia continues to support Milorad Dodik, president of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose actions and rhetoric threaten to destroy the country’s central government. On Serbia and KosovoDespite the hype generated by a recent proposal from France and Germany, a lasting solution remains unlikely. And on January 23 this week, Vucic gave a televised speech speech lasting an hour and a half, the content of which gives numerous reasons to doubt the good faith of his participation in the negotiations.
Meanwhile, Vucic effectively controls the media in Serbia, whose influence significantly reduces the space available for solutions to these problems, hindering the choices available to Serbian politicians – including his own. He constructed an image of the West as an enemy and introduces himself as struggling heroically not to succumb to Western pressure to align with EU sanctions against Russia or offer concessions to Kosovo. This discourse is amplified by the operations of Russian television in the country: the Russia Today program sanctioned by the EU spear its operations in Serbia in November 2022, while Sputnik has never stopped broadcasting there. Just after a meeting last week between Vucic and EU and US representatives on the Franco-German proposal, Sputnik broadcast Vucic’s January 23 speech, in which he expressed pride in resisting the alignment with EU sanctions against Russia. The speech was marked by statements of bad faith towards the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti, and the European and American delegations with whom he had just negotiated.
Vucic effectively controls the media in Serbia, whose influence significantly reduces the space available to find solutions to these problems.
If Brussels and Washington take note of all this, it is not obvious. Belgrade’s refusal to align with EU sanctions has so far not led to any serious consequences for its relations with the EU or the United States. The public rhetoric of EU And American Those responsible for Serbia continue to assume that Serbia is a reliable partner and a factor of regional stability, regardless of the harshest words spoken behind closed doors.
In short, Vucic’s confidence in his ability to continue his current momentum comes from the West’s consistent failure to develop and exercise the potential influence it has. Indeed, the president masterfully uses each of the key questions to mask responsibility for failing to meet the expectations of others.
Recognize Kosovo? Too difficult, given the right-wing nationalist opposition and public opinion (which Vucic helped shape). After the Franco-German proposal meeting last week, it announcement to Serbian public opinion that, thanks to him, the recognition of Kosovo is no longer possible.
Facing secessionism in Bosnia and Herzegovina? He pretends to do so, but Dodik appears as a welcome guest in Belgrade, including waiting to Serbia’s largest military exercises, which showcase Serbia’s military capacity to defend “our country and our people”. Along the same lines, the Serbian Foreign Minister is a regular guest at the unconstitutional January 9 celebrations in Banja Luka, which commemorates a war initiative aimed at unifying Republika Srpska and Serbia.
Decouple from Russia? He would like to, but 80 percent of the Serbian population opposes sanctions against Russia – in part thanks to the media he controls constantly broadcasting pro-Russian messages. The same goes for China, which has become the the largest investor in Serbia in 2022 and whose popularity in Serbia increased exponential, again because of government controlled media.
A different approach: possible, but unlikely
Serbia will have little incentive to change as long as there are no consequences for playing this way against the West. But the main obstacle lies as much in Western capitals as in Belgrade. When things get bad, Western leaders do not seem to want to invest political capital in the search for lasting solutions by attacking the root of the problems. Privately, for example, many Western officials suggest that Serbia is doing “enough” with Ukraine and that the West should not push it further into the arms of Russia and China.
Theoretically, the EU and the United States could approach the issue differently, applying a dual tactic towards Serbia: engagement and a cold attitude. They could each accompany the commitment to active use of political and economic levers towards well-defined objectives, such as putting an end to Serbia’s destabilizing policy of interference in the affairs of neighboring states which host Serbian minorities. But they should also be prepared to ensure that there are consequences for failing to meet these goals.
Neither the EU nor the United States lacks leverage in Serbia. Indeed, as the charts below show, Serbia is primarily integrated into Western economic structures, conducting most of its trade with the EU and receiving considerable foreign direct investment from the bloc. And even though China has grown in importance, its contribution to the Serbian economy is insignificant compared to the EU’s cumulative investment and trade. Russia is even less important: in 2021, 65 percent of Serbian exports went to the EU and only 3 percent to Russia. EU investments continue despite Serbia’s poor foreign policy record.
More broadly, key capitals such as Berlin and Washington could provide a stronger response to Vucic’s domestic anti-Western propaganda, thereby increasing the cost of using it. For example, European and American officials could stop granting him an audience every time he visits the region. Many sources have suggested over the years that fear of missing out would impact Vucic’s behavior. Playing on this could be one of the keys to changing the dynamic of the relationship.
To take another topic: this week, Vucic publicly declared that the EU was threatening to abolish the visa-free regime and withdraw all investments if it did not accept the Franco-German plan. This is probably exaggerated, given that the EU avoids using the visa-free regime as a threat and member states like Germany claim to have no control over private investors. Yet a stricter approach in this sense is precisely what is needed, along with additional measures such as broader targeted measures. sanction nationalist criminal actors who foment instability in the region, as well as their political bosses.
Indeed, the broader approach still fails to take into account the absolutely vital need to weaken the existing patronage system that ties government officials to clandestine networks, whether in Serbia or beyond its borders northern KosovoBosnia and Montenegro. Loosening the grip of criminal networks on the State and improving transparency in governance would have a significant ripple effect across the region, where state capture and criminality often hide behind destabilizing ethnic policies. Confused jurisdictions and legal gray areas in Republika Srpska or northern Kosovo, which political leaders seek to legitimize by demanding greater “ethnic autonomy,” allow organized crime to flourish and consolidate state capture . The history of Bosnia after Dayton is replete with examples that demonstrate the close link between criminality and nationalist politics.
Western policymakers should study these cases carefully before considering constitutional models in northern Kosovo, such as the Association of Serbian Municipalities. They must also be aware that, for Russia and China, opaque and unaccountable governance models provide ideal environments in which to operate. This issue should therefore be one of the first areas of focus for Western policymakers: resolving rule of law problems in Serbia and the region would make operations in that country more difficult for Russia and China and weaken the ethno-criminal influence networks in the Western Balkans.
All of this could be part of a new EU-US approach to the region, if major Western powers were indeed willing to adopt a longer-term framework and invest more capital policy. Yet for now, Western Balkan strongmen and broader associated networks will remain free to create instability in the region – an integral part of their methods of retaining power and remaining popular without accountability.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take a collective position. ECFR publications represent solely the opinions of their individual authors.
