By Vuk Vuksanović and Srđan Hercigonja
The first round of Turkish presidential elections is finished. The second round of the Turkish presidency will take place on May 28, 2023, promising a fierce fight between outgoing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his opponent Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. How will Turkish foreign policy unfold if the opposition candidate wins? Whatever the outcome of the elections, we will observe a surprising continuity in the country’s foreign policy, particularly with regard to the Balkans.
Under the leadership of Erdoğan, relations with the West were not always comfortable, which led Türkiye to diversify its partnerships by committing Russia, Middle East And Africa. Kılıçdaroğlu He recently promised that if he wins, his country’s foreign policy will turn “180 degrees.” However, the strong combination of international and domestic structures could guarantee a strong continuity of Turkish foreign policy, regardless of the victory of Erdoğan or the opposition.
Geopolitically, Turkey will continue to be squeezed between Europe, Russia and the Middle East. In this environment, to maintain its security, Turkey will have to rely on the security guarantees provided by its NATO membership mainly because Russia is still present in almost every theater that represents a security problem for Ankara, whether in the Black Sea, the Caucasus or thanks to the Russian presence in Syria in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. However, precisely because Russia has a presence almost everywhere in Turkey, the country’s foreign policy elites must have an open communication channel with the Russians to avoid unnecessary conflicts and guarantee Turkey’s geopolitical space for maneuver.
Multi-vector policy can be said to have a solid historical basis dating back to the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who believed that Turkey always needed an agency, which implied being, if not a great power , at least a country capable of shaping its own destiny, without depending on the will of external powers.
Economic factors will also strengthen these geopolitical forces. As Onur İşçi and Samuel J. Hirst, two Turkey-based academics, recently wrote in “War on the Rocks”: “Economic realities mean that whoever wins on May 14 will be forced to maintain relationships both with Western buyers of Turkish exports and with Russian and Chinese suppliers of major imports. For better or worse, these complementary ties will prevent a radical geopolitical realignment under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or his successor.” These authors emphasize that Turkey needs the West to have a viable economy, especially since Europe, with which Turkey has a customs union, is the largest export market for Turkish products. Yet on this same front, Turkey also needs energy imports from Russia and products made in China.
What is the place of the Balkans in this dynamic? The consensus among Turkish foreign policy experts is that Balkan policy would see the least change. On this point, we must put things into perspective. Turkey will always need Europe as its main customer and economic partner, regardless of who is in power in Ankara. To connect to Europe, whether by air, land or sea, Turkey will pass through the Balkans. Furthermore, from the Turkish perspective, if the country wants to become a player in broader Eurasia, it must have a defense perimeter and influence in the region. his European rear.
It is also worth pointing out that what gives value to the Balkans in Turkey is that, among all the regional theaters where Turkey is involved, the Balkans is a region that has been a success story for Ankara. Just compare Turkey’s relations with the Balkan countries to the security crises and rivalries that Turkey is experiencing in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Black Sea.
The opposition will also be aware of this reality and will want to preserve it. If it’s not broken, don’t fix it. The Balkans will remain another theater where Turkey, a country that needs the West, will be able to demonstrate its ability to cooperate with the West without sacrificing its autonomy.
As a member of NATO and part of a customs union with the EU, Turkey’s security and prosperity would be well served by integrating the Balkans with the West. In this context, Ankara, regardless of the ruling elites, can work with the West as long as Turkey believes that it does not blindly follow Western governments.
Domestic politics will also shape Ankara’s Balkan policy. It is estimated that up to 18 million Turkish citizens are from the Balkans. Over time, the Balkan factor will become an even more influential force in Turkish politics, affecting the country’s foreign policy to a large extent. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama expressing support for Erdoğan could be a sign of things to come. Ankara’s foreign policy is essentially two-fold. The emotional, which highlights special ties with ethnic groups and countries like Bosniaks and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the realistic and pragmatic, which makes Serbia Turkey’s most important interlocutor in Balkan affairs. Whoever takes the helm of Turkish policy in the Balkans will have to balance these two aspects in the future.
We should all watch the Turkish elections closely. If Kılıçdaroğlu wins, we could at first glance see changes in the country’s foreign policy, such as a more westward orientation and a cooling of ties with Russia. However, in the long term it is likely that these are only temporary cosmetics and that Turkish foreign policy, including in the Balkans, is least dependent on which political party governs in Ankara.
Dr Vuk Vuksanovic is a senior fellow at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy (BCSP) and associated with LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think tank within the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Srdjan Hercigonja is a senior researcher at BCSP. This article is partly based on their upcoming report for the BCSP.
