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At the Globsec Forum 2017 in Bratislava, we speak with Daniel Milo, Senior Researcher at the GLOBSEC Policy Institute. His main area of expertise is extremism, cyberhate, international extremist networks and the use of propaganda by foreign actors. He has published or co-authored several publications on these issues, including an analytical report mapping the links between the Kremlin and far-right political actors in Slovakia.
European Western Balkans: You worked as an advisor to the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. How do you assess the current situation in terms of democracy, media freedom and the rule of law in the Western Balkans?
Daniel Milo: There are worrying signals coming from the Western Balkans, as was also mentioned during one of the main panels. The prospect of membership in the EU and NATO for certain countries seems to be disappearing, which has a very negative influence on societies but also on the political landscape of these countries. By losing this prospect of having a real chance in the coming years of joining the EU and/or NATO, these countries could easily fall back into the chaos and extreme nationalism of the 1990s, which would have profound negative consequences not only only for these countries in the first place, but of course for greater Europe.
ISF: When you say “some countries in the region”, can you name a few and explain the main causes of this situation?
DM: It is evident that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia are perhaps the two most vulnerable or unstable countries in the region, facing many different challenges.
ISF: Many say that Russia exerts considerable influence in the region. Can you assess Russian strategy towards the Western Balkans? How do you see Russia’s work towards these countries?
DM: Yes, Western political circles and media circles are paying increased attention to Russia’s increased presence in this region. This seems to go hand in hand with some energy-related projects, buying up ownership of some energy monopolies, such as in Serbia, and trying to support forces resisting Euro-Atlantic integration. The case of the failed or attempted coup in Montenegro last October is a great example proving what kinds of methods and tools these actors use – proxies, people who went into the is from Ukraine and now working as mercenaries or loosely affiliated paramilitary actors who could be inserted into a particular country with a very clear mission. There are also worrying signs of an increased presence of these forces, not only in Macedonia but also in Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries.
ISF: In your opinion, what are the main security challenges for the Western Balkans region?
DM: One of the main security challenges is the disproportionate number of people from the region who have joined the conflict in Syria. If you look at the number and share of foreign fighters coming from the region into Syria compared to the number of people living in a particular country it is truly disturbing that such a large number of people, predominantly young people, are deciding to leave for Syria and fight alongside Islamic extremists. Once these people return to their country of origin, these countries would find themselves in the same situation as Belgium, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom, France, without having the safety net and all the countermeasures present in Western European countries. How to integrate these people, how to ensure that they do not radicalize others, that they will not one day commit a terrorist attack?
ISF: What do you think is the key strategy to reduce the number of people going there and what do you propose to solve this problem in the region, especially in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as these two countries are marked as the countries where most of these people came from?
DM: I just want to emphasize that this is not the only security challenge these countries face. Perhaps an even greater threat is the increasing polarization of societies and the collapse of post-conflict reconciliation processes in some countries. In some of these countries, reconciliation processes, largely led by the EU with the support of the United States, have stopped, or even reversed in some countries. What we might observe is the drawing of ethnic or national boundaries within countries and the repetition of the same old rhetoric that we heard in the 90s, which ultimately led to all the bloodshed and to all the victims we observed in the Balkans during the 1990s. Coming back to the issue of foreign fighters, I think this whole issue should be approached from several angles, starting with reducing foreign support for radical imams in this country. I think there needs to be a clear line between respecting freedom of religion and belief and allowing imams or priests to radicalize people and use religion as a political campaign tool, which seems to be the case in many mosques and other religious associations. Similar measures are currently being discussed and introduced in some Western European countries. It might be wise for Balkan governments to examine these measures which are currently being introduced in Western European countries facing the same type of dilemma.
The second step would be to intensify the activities of the security services, the police and the justice system to try to prevent people from traveling to these countries by imposing travel bans on individuals who show signs of radicalization and also to monitor people who return. I have no doubt that the monitoring of foreign fighters returning from the conflict in Syria is not very developed in this region due to the lack of personnel, financial means, etc. who have experienced military conflict and who have killed or witnessed war crimes is extremely difficult and time consuming and would require enormous financial and human capacities. Given all the challenges these countries face, the question is whether enough attention is being paid to this slowly brewing threat in the region.
ISF: You mentioned that there are statements like those from the 90s that are starting to be repeated in the region. You probably think of the stories of the great states of the region. How do you view these statements? Do you consider them serious threats to the region? Is it wise for the region to do this if it tries to join NATO or the EU?
DM: It is certainly very reckless and dangerous to hear again this type of rhetoric from “Greater Albania” and “Greater Serbia” which led to most of the bloodshed in the region. The resurrection of all kinds of historical grievances in the 21st century is actually a path leading to more bloodshed and conflict. Unfortunately, it seems that identity politics, which affects not only the Western Balkans but also Central and Eastern European countries and Western Europe, is on the rise. Religion and nationality, as the two main identities that most people associate with, are once again in full swing. It is rather difficult to advise strategies on how not to use such feelings and not repeat past mistakes. The only advice I would have would be to look at what preceded all the conflicts in different countries in the 90s, how easily it is possible to pass political statements and hate speeches broadcast in the media to someone who actually takes up arms and tries to act on such ideas.
ISF: You wrote an article on Russia’s links with far-right political actors in Slovakia. Do you think there is a similar approach from Russia towards the Western Balkan countries?
DM: Certainly. This is the pattern we see in Central and Eastern Europe, in the Balkans, but also in the Baltics. Russia attempts to use different domestic actors, whether fringe political activists or paramilitary groups, to increase its presence in a particular country. These national actors have proven, in certain countries, to be very effective in creating internal tensions and advancing discourses favorable to the Russian vision of the world. In some cases, I wouldn’t say it’s a direct consequence of Russia’s overt interference, it’s more of a coalition – when you have a group of national actors with the same worldview and the same programs as Russia, so they are natural allies. on particular questions and topics. Russia knows very well how to use these informal networks of actors from the political margins to try to increase its impact on certain parts of the population.
ISF: Montenegro will join NATO in the coming days. In your opinion, what are the consequences of Montenegro’s membership in NATO for neighboring countries in the region?
DM: The successful process of integrating Montenegro into NATO would be a signal to other countries in the region that playing with aspirations for a closer geopolitical alliance or cooperation with Russia is not really the best solution for their future. If you look at the map of this region you will see that – except for Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and all other countries – Macedonia is perhaps a special case for all historical reasons – the NATO covered the entire region. The Russians are well aware of this and that is why they tried to use different tools and methods to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO. Serbia has made it clear that – yes, we want to be part of the EU, but not NATO. There are historical, cultural and even religious reasons for this, and no one should really be pressured into joining NATO. But the question is whether increased security or military cooperation with Russia, as appears to be the case currently in Serbia, would actually benefit Serbian citizens or instead be a source of regional instability. If you look at the map, Serbia is almost surrounded by NATO member countries. In such a situation, is hosting Russian soldiers and Russian military installations really the best way to increase your security?
Nicholas RISTIĆNemanja Todorovic STIPLIJA
This article was produced with the support of THE Balkan Confidence for Democracy. The content of this article and the opinions expressed therein are the sole responsibility of the portal European Western Balkans and does not in any way reflect the views and opinions of the Balkan Confidence for Democracy nor the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
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