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During the Riga Conference 2017the Western Balkans European Portal spoke with Edgars Rinkevichs, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. We talked about the European integration of the Western Balkans, Montenegro’s membership in NATO and Russian influence in the region.
European Western Balkans: what is Latvia’s position regarding the European integration of the Western Balkans? Recently, we heard President Juncker say that Montenegro and Serbia are at the forefront of this process and that the EU could consider them for membership by 2025.
Edgars Rinkevichs: First of all, we support the EU enlargement process because we believe in it, thanks to our own experience. As we were candidates for EU and NATO membership in the 1990s, this was beneficial for two reasons. First, it has been beneficial to our own development – the reform process and the reform of the political, economic and social justice system. Secondly, we believe that EU enlargement also brings stability in the broadest possible sense. Remembering what happened in the late 1980s and particularly in the 1990s in the Balkan region, we believe that if the countries of the region are ready and if they have both fulfilled the criteria and implemented the reforms, and if we all agree within the European Union – currently at 28, soon to be 27, then we should continue this enlargement.
ISF: When Latvia attempted to become a member of the EU, it had to meet all the Copenhagen criteria and align with the acquis. But in the Balkans everyone has forgotten the Copenhagen criteria and it seems that no one in Brussels cares about the rule of law, human rights and minority rights in the Balkans. For them, “checking the boxes” of the European acquis is much more important than what happened in these countries.
emergency: I can’t completely agree with you on this point. I believe that the accession process has chapters directly related to issues of rule of law, judicial reform and human rights. Incidentally, the understanding of human rights has also evolved. If we compare the achievements of the 1990s with those of 2017, there are certain differences. There is also the global understanding of human rights and equality issues, which are also evolving in the EU.
I would even say that we are not all on the same wavelength on many things within the Union. So, from that perspective, I don’t agree with the idea that it’s about ‘ticking boxes’. Look at what happened recently in Macedonia with the electoral process and then the formation of the government. I think you also saw quite active involvement from Commissioner Hahn, you saw Federica Mogherini working with the leaders of the political parties and with the neighborhood at large.
From that perspective, I think there is a larger problem. It’s probably also this larger problem that people in the Balkans feel. I would also say that the same would apply at some point in the past to the Baltic States: “We will pass a certain number of laws, we will tick boxes, we will happily report to Brussels through the mechanisms that we have all made and adopted. all good laws, and now please accept us. The problem is that after the adoption of these laws there is also their implementation, and this is where we sometimes feel problems, not only in the Western Balkans, but also with the Eastern Partnership countries.
ISF: What are your country’s priorities regarding the Western Balkans accession process? What questions did you ask Brussels on Chapter 31, which concerns the foreign policy of the Western Balkan states?
emergency: For us, there are some problems. The first is that all candidate countries implement the acquis. We have requested the report from the Commission and they believe that progress has been sufficient. Whether it is the judicial sector, finance or the economy.
Regarding the second question, yes indeed. It is of utmost importance to us that all candidate countries align with the EU’s foreign and security policy, particularly after 2014 and especially after the illegal annexation of Crimea. And we know that there is one country that has not done so: Serbia. It would be a big debate here if there was a recommendation from the Commission to end the accession process and already start the admission of Serbia, if this country continued its policy of non-alignment with foreign policy and of security. This is what I said to the candidate countries and what I recently said to the press.
ISF: Montenegro recently became a member of NATO. Do you think this membership will contribute to the stability of the Western Balkans region, given the increased Russian presence in the region?
emergency: I think that Montenegro’s membership in NATO brings additional stability to the Balkans. We also found that there have been sufficient reform processes in the private sector, in public opinion and in general governance issues. From this point of view, we believe that there is already a positive dynamic in terms of security and stability.
Secondly, I also believe that Montenegro’s contribution to NATO operations is as important as that of any other NATO member state. For example, Latvia is not a large country with huge military assets and many soldiers. But I think what we have seen is that our resources, through joint NATO operations, contribute to common security, we are like Montenegro, for example. We are not only consumers of security, we are also providers of it. From this point of view, I think Montenegro is doing really well.
ISF: EU and NATO membership in Central and Eastern Europe sort of happened together. But some states, such as Serbia, which has declared its military neutrality, do not wish to become members of NATO. From your point of view, does this represent an obstacle to EU membership?
emergency: No not at all. I think we must respect Serbia’s decision not to apply for NATO membership. I don’t believe we have the right to dictate to a government what its security policy should be. For us, NATO and EU membership were complementary for many reasons, but we respect the decision of any government, whether in the Balkans or the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood.
For example, three countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – want to become members of the EU. We have Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan who do not want to become members of the EU. We respect these decisions. We also believe that everyone must respect the decisions of people and governments, but in this case Serbia is free to choose only EU membership, but not NATO membership.
ISF: How would you compare Russian influence in the Baltic and the Balkans? In the Balkans, Russian influence has increased in recent years, starting in 2008. Do you think Russia uses its soft power in the region and to what extent?
emergency: I think there are similarities and differences. I agree that Russia is trying to use its influence – economic or informational warfare tools, propaganda tools or religious organizations. We have an Orthodox Church and we know that it is very close to the Russian Orthodox Church, and we also know that the Russian Orthodox Church is very close to the government. We also saw economic and trade relations. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Baltic states were heavily dependent on Russian energy and trade. This has changed. We have also seen attempts to invest and strengthen economic ties with Balkan countries.
The difference is that I still believe that it is more and more difficult for Russia to play with EU and NATO member states than with a state that is still not part of the club – that whether it is NATO or the EU. The EU has its regulations. The EU’s soft power has shown its strength, especially in 2014. We still have many questions regarding economics and political debates on how to continue building our Union. But I nevertheless believe that, to a certain extent, we are even better protected against attempts to influence us directly.
The publication of this article was supported by the Balkan Trust for Democracy of the German Marshall Fund of the United States
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