The Open Balkan initiative was launched three years ago by the leaders of Albania, Serbia and North Macedonia to facilitate the free movement of people, goods, services and capital in the region. So far, Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina have refused to join, arguing that the initiative was unnecessary because regional economic cooperation is already part of the EU integration agenda and initiatives such that the Berlin process. This process was established in 2014 as a platform for high-level cooperation between the six countries of the Western BalkansMember States and EU institutions, international financial institutions as well as regional civil society and businesses.
DW: Mr. Joseph, you spent many years working in countries around the world. Western Balkans. What is your view on the Open Balkan initiative?
Edward P. Joseph: The dangers of the Open Balkan are not well understood, although they are clear to many in the Balkans themselves.
I served for over a dozen years – including during the war years – in every conflict-affected Balkan country. Like many in the region, I see the dynamics through this prism, particularly the assertion of Greater Serbian nationalism, which is today being put forward by President Aleksandar Vucic and its delegates under the banner of the “Serbian World”.
The Open Balkans initiative is not only a distraction from the region’s fundamental problems – which are political – it actually risks making those political problems worse.
We can summarize the problems of Open Balkan as follows: “dubious theory, naive construction, dangerous implications”.
Let’s start with the implicit theory behind Open Balkan: “Trade equals trust.” (That’s my description). Unfortunately, this theory clashes head-on with reality. Just look at the rage Russian aggression against Ukraine. Until February 24, Russia and Ukraine enjoyed huge trade, with a combined value of exports and imports worth almost $10 billion. Right away, China conducts aggressive military exercises against Taiwan – a country that exports $273 billion worth of goods to China, including critical semiconductors. China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, accounting for a third of its trade.
According to the Open Balkans theory, all these countries should live in peace. Instead, they are either at war or about to. Supporters of the opening of the Balkans should be asked to explain themselves on this point.
Instead of “trade equals trust,” I propose a significantly different conclusion, namely that the impact of trade depends on the character of the regime, whether democratic or autocratic/authoritarian. If Western-oriented democracies trade, then, yes, there are political benefits.
But if autocracies – especially those like Russia, China and, yes, Serbia under Aleksandar Vucic who have territorial and political ambitions and destabilize their neighbors – conduct trade, then there is growing distrust, not trust.
Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic said in a recent interview that the Open Balkans initiative would end with the disappearance of Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is your response to this statement?
I find this significant for one major reason: it affirms the reality that Open Balkan supporters ignore: the strong opposition. It doesn’t matter what your opinion is on Djukanovic, on Albin Kurti, or on the Bosnian or Croatian leaders who have the same concerns.
What matters is that there is strong opposition to an initiative that its supporters say is “solely aimed at creating jobs and growing the economy.” Proponents of Open Balkan must ask themselves: “Why is there this opposition to our supposedly benign initiative?” Why would anyone object?
To ask the question is to answer it: if there is so much opposition, then the initiative cannot be completely harmless. There must be legitimate concerns. Supporters of this initiative must listen to the objections of skeptics in the region, instead of simply pushing them to accept this initiative.
The leaders of the countries that have joined this initiative are convinced that it will benefit their countries and their citizens. Which country will benefit the most, both financially and politically?
Serbia will always benefit more than others. This is another of Open Balkan’s main mistakes. Proponents talk about it as if all economies in the region are the same size and character. They are not the same at all.
Serbia’s economy, for example, is about 14 times larger than that of Montenegro. Serbia’s economy is approximately double that of Albania and North Macedonia combined. Serbia will always benefit more from open barriers (the four freedoms) than its neighbors; Serbia will be able to produce higher value export goods, thus becoming even more dominant.
This economic power translates into political power. Look at Germany in the European Union. Remember that Germany’s neighbors, such as France, were very worried about German economic power, even after World War II. France and other European countries did not want Germany to have access to coal and other resources.
France did not agree to some sort of “open Europe” with Germany until it was assured that trade relations would be placed under a global umbrella. This structure became the basis of the European Union we know today.
Germany has consolidated its democracy, which we know and respect today. A war between France and Germany is now unthinkable.
But violence, even war, is not unthinkable between Serbia, or between Serbian-backed proxies, or others in the Balkans.. Giving even more power to an autocratic state like Serbia under Vucic is irresponsible. The situation would be different if Serbia were a committed democracy, embracing the Western order.
What makes sense is to follow the economic cooperation model under a broader framework – in this case, one that emphasizes mutual respect, inclusion, EU values and is endowed of a global supervision state like Germany.
From your point of view, does Open Balkan undermine the “Berlin Process” initiative?
Yes of course. Open Balkan is a competing initiative in a region that already has several entities and initiatives, including the “Berlin Process”, CEFTA and the Regional Cooperation Council, to help coordinate and promote concrete measures.
What do you think the future holds for the Open Balkan?
It depends on the wisdom of the leaders of the region, the United States and the EU. If they understand that the region’s challenges – even economic problems – are political in nature, they will not support a regime that makes political problems worse.
Analyzing the economic situation in Bosnia, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) highlights the political problems – the impasse created by the Dayton Agreement.
In fact, Bosnia and Herzegovina benefits from the “four freedoms” promoted by Open Balkan. For more than two decades, the free movement of people, goods, services and capital has existed.
The same “magical claims” about the Open Balkan were made about trade within Bosnia and Herzegovina: “As soon as they can trade, they will focus on money and forget about all these divisions. »
Instead, as the EBRD points out, there are serious economic obstacles due to the convoluted Dayton Agreement, which is based on the country’s ethno-territorial division and complex political rights. This requires a serious political strategy, not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but for the region.
Does Russia’s influence in the Balkans pose a serious threat in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?
Russian influence, Chinese influence, and Hungarian influence all pose serious threats. Any influence of undemocratic regimes is a negative factor in the Balkans.
It is about recognizing where the vulnerability comes from: only one country in the region, Serbia, rejects the Western order for the region. This is why the regime led by Vucic is joining forces with Hungary, China and Russia.
Edward P. Joseph is a professor at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington. He worked in the Balkans as a field practitioner specializing in conflict management and until 2012 was Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.
Editors: Aingeal Flanagan, Rüdiger Rossig