Over the past decade, relations between Hungary and Serbia have become so close that they consider each other “sincere partners and friends» as described by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić during the first meeting of the Strategic Council for Cooperation between the two countries, held on June 20 in Palić. This was another high-level meeting (two leaders met and discussed 41 times over the past two years) and a further confirmation of what officials on both sides call a “historic reconciliation” between the two countries.
Given the difficult past and historical disputes between Serbia and Hungary, this rapprochement has raised many questions, including what is the Hungarian foreign policy strategy towards Serbia and whether it is part of the Hungarian approach broader with regard to the Western Balkans.
Hungary has become one of the major players in the Western Balkans since Viktor Orbán’s return to power in 2010. Although there is no written strategy specifically defining Hungary’s foreign policy towards the Western Balkans , the Hungarian presence in the region and the close ties established between the Western Balkans The leaders of these countries show the important role that the Western Balkans play in Budapest’s broader foreign policy approach.
Orbán’s goal of transforming Hungary from a middle-income country into a regional power and positioning itself as a key player in Central Europe is at the heart of his policy towards the region. As a pragmatic leader, driven by the interest of strengthening Hungary’s position internationally and consolidating its power domestically, Orbán sees the Western Balkans as a perfect ally that can help achieve his goals.
That said, it is not surprising that Hungary is a strong supporter of accelerated accession of Western Balkan countries to the EU, especially since the current European Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement is Olivér Várhelyi, a Hungarian diplomat. loyal to the Orbán regime. While he is considered a true ally of the leaders of the Western Balkan countries, he is criticized by Brussels for neglecting rule of law reforms in the candidate countries.
Hungary’s EU enlargement efforts are based on political, economic and security interests
There are several reasons for Hungary’s interest in promoting EU enlargement. First, as the Hungarian government is often criticized by Brussels for its democratic backsliding and illiberal practices, having like-minded regimes within the EU, as in most Western Balkan countries, would be of great benefit to strengthen the power of this potential illiberal bloc. , thus reducing pressure from Brussels.
This is particularly important in the current geopolitical circumstances and the ongoing war in Ukraine, which has led to a notable distance between the Orbán regime and the last of its partners among the Visegrad countries, particularly Poland. No longer having Poland to watch Hungary’s back in the face of EU pressure puts Budapest in a position where it needs new allies within the EU.
In addition to these political interests, Hungary’s concrete security concerns also influence support for EU enlargement. It is of crucial importance for Budapest to maintain stability in the region, mainly due to the persistent fear of a possible spread of instabilities from the Western Balkans since the 1990s.
To prevent this from happening, Hungary sees the solution in the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region, which is why it also participates in peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. During recent violent protests in Kosovo, peacekeepers, notably the Hungarian KFOR contingent, were attacked and injuredwhich leads to 12 of them were transferred from Kosovo.
In addition to being seen as a potential security threat, the Western Balkans are also a security provider for Hungary, particularly when it comes to migration. Since the 2014–2015 migration crisis, the Orbán government has viewed illegal immigration as an important security issue and used the issue as an instrument to win voter support and consolidate its power in anti-immigration campaigns. In this sense, Hungary’s top priority is to cooperate with Serbia and North Macedonia, the main transit countries, to control the migratory influx to Hungary.
Economic cooperation between Hungary and the region should not be neglected either. The level of trade and the number of Hungarian investments have increased significantly, making economic interests an additional reason to encourage the European integration of the region and its inclusion in the EU single market. The expansion of large Hungarian companies, such as OTP Bank or 4iG, as well as investments in Hungarian media in the region, also serve to achieve political goals, further deepen ties between regimes and position Hungary as a regional power .
A partnership with Vučić’s Serbia based on much more than an ideology
Of all the Western Balkan countries, Serbia is the most important bilateral partner, mainly because it has a large Hungarian minority. As part of Budapest’s broader approach to supporting Hungarian communities living outside Hungary’s borders, the Serbian and Hungarian regimes have identified reconciliation between communities living in Vojvodina as a primary goal. However, the political proximity between the leaders of the two countries has not fully translated to the societal level.
This also affects the decline of the Hungarian population living in Serbia, which is mainly due to the introduction of the dual nationality law, which allows Hungarians living abroad to obtain a Hungarian passport and full voting rights . Many saw this as an opportunity to obtain a European passport and settle more easily in EU member states, or simply to travel, study or work there.
Although precise data on the number of Hungarians who left Serbia is not available, the results of the 2022 census show that the number of Hungarians in Serbia decreased by almost 28% compared to the results of the 2011 census (then that the overall depopulation in Serbia from 2011 to 2022 is 6.7%).
Besides Serbia’s specific position as the only Western Balkan country with a Hungarian minority, the most recent announcements of joint projects and cooperation in the energy sector between Serbia and Hungary make Serbia the largest Hungarian partner In the region.
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the two leaders have agreed to build a new oil pipeline that would connect Serbia to the Druzhba oil pipeline. The Serbian president also announced that Serbia would buy 5-10% of the shares in the new Paks 2 nuclear power plant in Hungary. Gas cooperation has also intensified, as Hungary receives Russian gas mainly via Serbia and the so-called Balkan Stream pipeline, while Serbia depends on Hungarian gas storage.
These and other projects are undertaken primarily due to the close personal business ties between President Vučić and Prime Minister Orbán.
The latest example of a commercial affair involving Serbian and Hungarian companies came to light last month, when a proposal disclosed from the Hungarian group MVM has been published. For a joint venture with the Serbian state-owned energy company Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS), the proposal foresees that the MVM Group would invest 600 million euros and that EPS would give up 11 hydroelectric plants. As with the rest of the projects mentioned above that lack economic justification, the same goes for this announcement: it does not seem reasonable to start the process of privatizing a key state-owned company and abandoning renewable energy resources in times of crisis and energy uncertainty.
Historical, geographical and economic ties make Serbia and Hungary natural partners. Relations will likely persist and even strengthen even after the end of two autocratic regimes. However, the longer the rule of Orbán and Vučić lasts, the more it will be necessary to regain bilateral ties between the two countries and separate the national interest from the corrupt particularist relations between their leaders.
