With the return of war to European territory, the European Union has rediscovered its geopolitical ambitions and capabilities. And yet, how to rebuild a post-war European security architecture remains a dilemma. Over the last year, many of the fundamental assumptions that underpin the EU’s global vision and action have been shaken.
The Union has learned that – from the economy to energy to defense – strategic dependence exposes it to unfavorable circumstances and can, ultimately, jeopardize European integration. The EU world tightened As Russia became a systemic enemy, China strengthened its status as an economic competitor, and the Global South became increasingly vocal in its criticism of the European model.
Now more than ever, the path forward for the EU to play a credible international role lies in its neighborhood. If it wants to realize its global ambitions, it must learn to play the role of regional political actor.
It is not easy. The EU is not an island and no ocean separates it from some of the world’s most troubled regions – from the Balkans to its eastern neighborhood, from the Middle East to Africa. In addition, its relations with neighboring countries have been go through a profound and difficult evolution.
The prospect of membership, which represented a powerful foreign policy instrument at the beginning of the century, is unattractive (United Kingdom), poisoned (Western Balkans, Türkiye), excluded (North Africa) or too far away (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia). Over time, the EU has developed various programs to keep these countries engaged and connected, but with little success. In fact, the EU is losing its grip on the European sphere, leaving a political vacuum that is quickly filled by other actors, while fueling conflicts and crises.
A new and hopeful initiative
There is therefore reason and need for a new strong political initiative for a return of the EU as a regional power. Can the new European political community (EPC) represents such an ambitious project? It is difficult to tell from its first demonstration in Prague on October 6. Forty-four countries, 27 EU Member States and 17 partners, including the United Kingdom and Turkey, met the day before the informal summit convened by the Czech rotating presidency of the Council of the EU.
It was a great photo opportunity and a significant demonstration of the cohesion of the European family in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine. Discussions took place on two issues of the day: energy and security/stability. There was even a limited but tangible result, facilitated by French President Emmanuel Macron. An EU civilian mission is to be sent to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border to facilitate a normalization of their conflicting relations, shaken by the fallout from Russia’s violent focus on Ukraine. Eventually there was a promise to meet again in six months in Moldova, and again after six months in the UK.
In some ways this is a surprising result. The idea has taken off at incredible speed, by European standards, since it was spear by Macron on the occasion of Europe Day (May 9). European institutions and certain European leaders, including German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, then supported and relaunched the initiative.
Only if we clarify its objectives will it be possible to adapt the format and composition, and not the other way around.
It is certain that the escalation of the war in Ukraine and the subsequent offer to Ukraine and Moldova of candidate country status – as well as the need to provide answers to European citizens who Express their preferences for the continent at the Conference on the Future of Europe – were crucial accelerators. And the changing political and economic situation in the United Kingdom after Brexit helped convince the new Prime Minister, Liz Truss, to be present at the European family reunion.
The project proponents had to clarify some key aspects and make some changes to the plan to make it attractive to key partners. The EPC should not replace enlargement, as some Western Balkan countries and Eastern partners fear. It will also not be institutionalized, as this would have prevented the United Kingdom from participating in it. And there must be no overlap with other pan-European organizations, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.
All this enabled the inclusive format of the 44 in Prague. However, these clarifications will not be enough to make the EPC an effective and sustainable initiative that can represent the backbone of Europe’s geopolitical future. Only if we clarify its objectives will it be possible to adapt the format and composition, and not the other way around.
Values or interests
There are two main visions for the EPC. The first is to create a political space in which the EU’s neighbors will remain committed to it. The lack of institutionalization can then pose a problem. If the EU wants to take the lead and avoid nationalization of the project, Brussels institutions should play a key role in setting the agenda and ensuring its monitoring.
Furthermore, only access to European institutions with a decision-making role can offer added value to partner countries. Some proposals have already been put forward: pre-EU summit meetings expanded to include partners and a parliamentary forum bringing together the European Parliament and the parliaments of partner countries. In this scenario, the criterion for EPC membership should be commitment to the fundamental values of the EU, including respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
A different idea would be to use the EPC to rally the European family against Russia, with the aim of resolving pressing problems and long-term security concerns. Interests, more than shared values and rules, would then provide a common platform. The informal intergovernmental framework chosen in Prague would be ideal, as it allows for a flexible format and a large number of members. However, if this responds very well to the urgency of the moment, it is less convincing as a recipe for the later phases. It is difficult to imagine how the EPC could then evolve from a first exchange of notes on Ukraine into something significant for the future of Europe.
The most important task at the moment for the EU is to develop a clear vision of what is at stake for it and what its objective is.
For the moment, there is therefore no single, clear long-term perspective, and it will be difficult to ensure a convergence of interests between 44 States and adequate monitoring without a formal structure. It is also questionable whether it is wise for the EU to sponsor an initiative on the European continent that it cannot control – since it advocates the participation of all states on an equal footing and excludes a role for the EU caucus.
A third path can however be explored, in which the intergovernmental framework of the EPC serves as a political forum to discuss key foreign and security policy issues between the EU and partner countries, linked to the agenda of the EU summits. EU. This could start with visible and concrete projects that could be advanced and implemented by differentiated groups of members with the support of European institutions.
A starting point could be a Next Generation Ukraine program, intended to support Ukrainian resilience and future reconstruction. This would allow the EU to remain in the driver’s seat, while ensuring the format is sustainable and membership is inclusive – even if some partners could withdraw.
The most important task at the moment for the EU is to develop a clear vision what is at stake and what it is for. Without clear direction, even the most seemingly clever policy inventions can backfire.
This is a joint publication of Social Europe And IPS-JournaI