In recent years, Russia has become increasingly visible in the Balkans. Its forays into the region are fueling perceptions of the region as a geopolitical battleground, with Turkey, China and even the Gulf monarchies also posing a challenge to the West. Russia stands out from the list. Unlike other external actors, Moscow has wholeheartedly assumed the role of troublemaker acting against Western interests. Moscow is fiercely opposed to the accession of the countries of the former Yugoslavia to NATO and is also not a friend of the European Union (EU), although its attitude towards its enlargement remains ambiguous. Russia is also unique in terms of the range of capabilities it makes available. Its toolbox covers hard military power, economic instruments – particularly with regard to the energy sector – elements of what analysts define as “sharp power” (e.g. disinformation and disruption ), as well as a certain degree of cultural appeal or “soft power” rooted in shared religion and history with a number of South Slavic nations. Although significantly lagging behind the EU and NATO, Russia has proven to be an increasingly influential player in the region.
Russia’s strategy
The Western Balkans are an integral part of Russia’s strategy to establish itself as a leading player in European security affairs, alongside other major states such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom. . Since the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s, the region has been at the forefront of debates on crucial issues such as transatlantic relations, EU security and defense policy and NATO/EU enlargement . Having a foot in the Balkans means having a say on strategic issues that have direct consequences for Russia. Moscow is motivated by geopolitics, with other concerns such as economic interests or historical ties to the South Slavs or other Orthodox nations playing a secondary role. He sees the Balkans as a vulnerable periphery of Europe where Russia can gain a foothold, recruit supporters, and ultimately maximize its influence vis-à-vis the West.
There is no doubt that Southeast Europe lies well beyond what Russia considers its preferred geopolitical sphere of interest. Economically, socially but also purely geographically, the former Yugoslav republics and Albania gravitate towards the West. Russia’s only option is to act in an obstructive manner to undermine the EU and NATO, exploiting the Balkans’ own vulnerabilities, whether through nationalist-fueled conflicts inherited from the 1990s, pervasive corruption and state capture, or citizens’ distrust of public institutions. . Rather than dragging the Western Balkans into its own orbit, a costly exercise for a country whose gross domestic product (GDP) is comparable to that of Spain, Russia is seeking leverage in this region that it could then exercise with the EU and the United States. . Influence in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro or elsewhere is a bargaining chip in Russia’s strategic competition with Western powers. From Moscow’s perspective, projecting power in the Balkans is tantamount to giving the West a taste of its own medicine. If the Europeans and Americans interfere in its backyard – Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia or any other part of its “near abroad” – Russia is entitled to do the same in theirs.
The perception that the United States humiliated Moscow during the 1999 Kosovo crisis also plays a role, justifying engagement in the region as a means of righting past wrongs. Russia’s so-called return to the Balkans, which is happening largely at the invitation of local authorities, is a reward for the West for its own arrogance. Finally, active involvement in the region underlines Russia’s role in European security, particularly on salient and politicized issues such as NATO enlargement, negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo or the situation in Bosnia. -Herzegovina. This gives Moscow the coveted status of a leading power, whose interests and networks extend throughout the Old Continent and beyond. Russia can exploit scarce resources to achieve maximum results, whether diplomatic or commercial gains, or simply confirmation of Moscow’s status as an indispensable international player. Not being bound by any particular ideology or normative aspirations, as was the case with its Soviet predecessor, also gives today’s Russia an advantage.
Moscow’s toolbox
To achieve its goals, Russia uses coercion, co-optation and subversion.
As a rule, coercion by military means is of less importance for the Western Balkans than for other regions exposed to Russia. At the same time, soft coercion borders on disruption, and Russia uses many different instruments to assert its interests: hard military power, manipulation of economic ties, interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and targeted information campaigns to influence public opinion. Interference in domestic politics is far from rare. A typical example would be the support Russia has given to nationalist activists in pro-EU and NATO countries like Montenegro and North Macedonia. Peaceful political action (anti-government demonstration) could degenerate into violence. Other examples of soft coercion, practiced in the post-Soviet space and the Balkans, include trade embargoes and cyberattacks.
Co-optation is Russia’s instrument of choice in the Western Balkans. Moscow has established partnerships and alliances with local power holders in Serbia and the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The motivations for choosing to work with the Russian state, or with its agents and subcontractors, differ; some benefit from a direct monetary gain in the form of rent, others derive an advantage in terms of managing the balance of power between states at regional or national levels. Thus, Serbia aligned itself with Russia to maximize its influence on the Kosovo issue, but also because successive governments sought to profit from investments and trade relations, undoubtedly including bribes. wine and related payments. Russia has also proven to be an indispensable ally for Milorad Dodik in his efforts to consolidate his hold on Republika Srpska and resist pressure from the West, from the main Bosnian parties favoring greater centralization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and from opposition within the Serbian-majority entity. .
Subversion is exemplified by tactics such as (dis)information campaigns and overt or covert support for radical anti-Western actors (parties and civic associations). In the Western Balkans, the best example is provided by efforts to block the NATO membership of Montenegro (in 2015-2016) and North Macedonia (in 2017-2018). In both cases, Moscow fanned the flames of internal crises to thwart NATO expansion. One of the advantages of subversion is its low cost. Russia has no long-term plan for the Balkans, other than obstructing the West, and is not prepared to spend its scarce economic and military resources or take risks, such as direct confrontation. with NATO. Instead, it exploits weaknesses and blind spots in Western politics to claim equal status and possibly generate leverage that could be used as a strategic bargaining chip with the United States and Europe. Another merit of subversion, as well as co-optation, is that it lends itself to outsourcing. Indeed, Russian influence is exercised through both formal and informal channels. Public institutions, such as the Russian Foreign Ministry, are just the tip of the iceberg. Many other actors, both inside and outside the state, are also involved.
Policy recommendations:
Don’t give up on NATO and EU enlargement. Countries in the region should be integrated into Western institutions as soon as possible. Any delay caused by the lack of will or commitment to expansion on the part of the current Member States reinforces the feeling of abandonment of the peoples of the Balkans. This fuels anti-Western attitudes and empowers the Kremlin and its proxies. NATO in particular should deepen its strategic cooperation with Serbia and encourage the new government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to activate the country’s Membership Action Plan (MAP). The EU is expected to launch accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania.
Focus on democracy and the rule of law. Integration into the EU and NATO is not a goal in itself but a means to an end. Consolidating democracy and improving the rule of law are essential to countering malign influences from outside. Western policy should therefore focus on the underlying flaws that enable Russian interference. The West should encourage greater transparency in party financing, judicial reform and good governance in the energy sector. This is the best path to strengthening the resilience of national political systems and responding to co-optation and subversion.
Promoting pluralism in the media. Russian influence is most powerful in the information field. To respond, Western states and institutions should increase their support for alternative media that are not beholden to governments and/or oligarchic interests in the region. The pro-Kremlin view should be balanced by independent journalism. The goal should not be to combat propaganda with counter-propaganda. In fact, free media only gain credibility by freely offering a critical perspective on the EU, NATO or Western politics in general. But they also hold Russia accountable for its foreign policy actions and offer a balanced and fair perspective on Russian politics and society. Most importantly, by scrutinizing power holders and economic elites, free media limits the ability of malign foreign actors to penetrate domestic politics by cutting deals with local actors.
Dimitar Bechev is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.. Follow him on Twitter @DimitarBechev.
This piece is an adapted version of a policy report prepared for the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence in Riga.
Further reading
Image: Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with his Serbian counterpart Aleksandar Vucic in Sochi, Russia December 4, 2019. Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via REUTERS