Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (right) and his Bulgarian counterpart Nikolai Denkov are seen during a meeting at the Maximos mansion in Athens last week. The Greek prime minister, the author claims, is expected to spearhead a tour of the Balkans with government officials and business representatives, aimed at strengthening the country’s active presence in the region. (PA)
The situation in parts of the Western Balkans is unstable and problematic in the rest. The prospects of joining the European Union have faded and the new momentum coming mainly from Ukraine but also from Moldova, in the shadow of the Moscow-Kiev war, has encountered the reluctance of certain States members of the Union to accelerate enlargement, as well as the inability of national governments to carry out reforms to bring their country’s system up to EU standards. I remember being in Washington, DC, a year ago, and hearing the cry of despair from Nikola Dimitrov, then Foreign Minister of North Macedonia, regarding the serious consequences for the stability and the democratization of the Western Balkans if their citizens began to lose confidence in the EU. enlargement intentions.
Greek politics has inevitably entered a new cycle 20 years after the first EU-Western Balkans summit in Thessaloniki. It is therefore essential that we formulate a holistic rather than piecemeal approach. Greece has serious unfinished business with Albania due to the case of Fredi Beleri (the imprisoned elected mayor of Greek origin of Himare), while we are also blocking the implementation of the terms agreed with North Macedonia , wasting valuable time, given that the next elections in the neighboring country will likely see the resurgence of the nationalist VMRO party, which opposes the Prespes name agreement with Greece.
Regarding Albania, we naturally have an obligation to secure the best possible future for the Greek ethnic minority by using their European aspirations to exert effective pressure for the rule of law. It is regrettable, however, that the initial Greek position was to challenge the Albanian justice system instead of insisting that the newly elected mayor be allowed to take the oath of office. The situation has reached a point where Greece cannot back down, not only on the Beleri case, but also on other outstanding issues, such as land ownership issues, the law on self-determination, as well as the demarcation of an exclusive economic zone, which the Albanian government is dragging its feet. If this were the case, it would fuel Albanian nationalism to the detriment of a positive outlook in relations between the two countries. As for Beleri, the conclusion of this case, one way or another, will send a message to the EU and the region that our country is capable of exercising effective policy and defending its well-intentioned interests. If Albania’s membership prospects remain intact without the Beleri issue being resolved (it is good that the process has become more politicized and reversible since 2020), this will encourage Tirana to take advantage of the situation in terms of concerns the resolution, or non-resolution, of the issues mentioned above. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama is banking on emerging as the natural leader of the entire Albanian population in the region, to win the favor of leaders like German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, but also those of the United States. He believes that he will thus be able to neutralize any pressure that Athens might want to exert on him by using Albania’s integration into the EU as leverage.
Beyond that, Greece has no say in the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, it supports the European position on the Bosnian question and even if Greek economic activity makes a dynamic return to the region , it still needs to be combined with diplomatic initiatives aimed at resolving bilateral disputes, as well as participating in multilateral partnerships through which Greece can, in the long term, lay the foundations for a Balkan pact for peace, cooperation and development. The objective of such an initiative would be to maintain the legal acquis, regardless of changes in government. Athens can and should become more active in the region, starting with a Balkan tour by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and a delegation of government officials and businessmen. It would also be good if Greece finalized its position on EU enlargement by 2033 in the form of a roadmap that the Prime Minister could present to his Balkan counterparts. This road map negotiated by Athens could also be developed after the tour, once the prime minister has heard what other leaders in the region have to say. This cannot replace EU policy or constitute an attempt to get ahead of Brussels. Such an effort would be doomed to failure. But this road map could serve to prioritize issues and establish a permanent dialogue between the States of the region, both at higher and lower levels, between politicians, business leaders and cultural figures, and certainly with members of the new generation.
The international turbulence and instability that reign in and around the Balkans authorize, even require, initiatives in favor of the creation of a Balkan regional council which could become a mechanism for the exchange of good practices and management, or even settlement. , daily problems. common life and challenges facing the region as a whole, leaving the management of major issues to the EU and NATO. In this way, joint development cooperation strategies could be developed, with Thessaloniki at the center of these processes. Another asset for Greece is the country’s leading role in the Western Balkans’ energy interconnection with suppliers and markets.
Constantinos Filis is an associate professor at the American College of Greece and director of the ACG Institute of Global Affairs.
