Paul Taylor is a senior editor at POLITICO
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine finally made the European Union aware of the strategic importance of the Western Balkans and the potential for Moscow to exploit unresolved disputes in the region to weaken the West.
EU leaders must now seize the geopolitical opportunity to reorganize the integration of the six small, economically fragile countries, with a total population of less than 18 million, into the Union, or risk seeing them used by Russia and China in their power games.
Despite deep disillusionment with the slow progress since the EU formally gave them accession prospects in 2003, EU membership remains the best imaginable outcome for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, as well as for the rest of Europe. .
If the EU continues to keep them at bay, the alternatives could be closer alignment with Russia, the emergence of an illiberal, non-aligned zone that could stretch from Hungary to Turkey, or – even worse – a downward spiral towards a new armed conflict. , involving a toxic mix of organized crime and armed migration.
Some Western European capitals, notably Paris and The Hague, where EU enlargement fatigue is most intense, assume that the status quo is manageable and poses no serious risks to European security. It is certain that people in the Western Balkans are war-weary after the horrors of the 1990s.
The situation may seem under control, but it cannot continue indefinitely. There is no guarantee that unresolved conflicts in Bosnia or between Serbia and Kosovo will remain frozen with minor flare-ups, nor that localized political violence will not intensify, attracting external actors and fueling new flows of refugees, arms and drugs to the EU. The recent clashes over Kosovo Serb license plates show how a small spark can ignite dry tinder.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine has angered many in the region, fueling ultranationalism among radical pro-Russian Serbs and rekindling searing memories of death and destruction among those who lived through the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.
Moscow is trying to stoke pan-Slavic Orthodox nationalism and exploit divisions wherever possible. He supported Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik in his threats to secede from Bosnia and spread disinformation to amplify Kosovo Serb hostility toward the Pristina government.
China, for its part, has primarily continued its economic investments, using the 14+1 framework under its Belt and Road Initiative to engage with local leaders seeking ambitious infrastructure and defense. It follows Russia’s lead on the Western Balkans at the UN Security Council and uses its financial might to dissuade Balkan states from supporting critical resolutions on human rights abuses in Xinjiang or Hong Kong. Kong.
Pro-government Serbian media relay Russian discourse on the war in Ukraine, and Russian media contribute to anti-Kosovo war hysteria. Both Russia and China contributed to Serbia’s rearmament. Moscow also has powerful energy leverage since Serbia obtains 80% of its gas from Russia while Bosnia is 100% dependent on it. This is partly why Serbia has refused to align with EU sanctions against Russia, angering Brussels.
The EU has the most powerful long-term levers, if it is prepared to use them, given the widespread public aspiration to join the bloc across the region, with the exception of Serbia . However, France and the Netherlands have since led resistance to further enlargement, mainly out of fear of immigration and organized crime.
Neighboring EU members Greece and Bulgaria have long obstructed the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s EU and NATO bid to demand it change its name and accept the narrative of Sofia on its own history and its Bulgarian minority.
Even after agreeing to change its name to North Macedonia in 2018, France vetoed the opening of negotiations with Skopje and Albania to demand reform of the accession process to include the principle of reversibility in case of going backwards. Talks finally began in July, but North Macedonia must still amend its constitution next year to incorporate terms agreed with Bulgaria, a potential political trap since the government lacks a qualified majority.
When EU leaders rushed to grant candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova in June in response to Russian aggression, Western Balkan elites understandably feared that their countries would be pushed back even more in the queue for membership. Similarly, when German Chancellor Olaf Scholz demanded that the EU reform its decision-making system to remove national vetoes on sanctions and tax policy before admitting new members, it seemed like an even longer wait.
So what should the EU do now? First, more visible political engagement.
The EU got off to a better start this year by paying attention to this long-neglected region. There were two EU-Western Balkans summits – including one in the region for the first time – as well as a relaunch of the Berlin process aimed at supporting regional economic integration towards membership of the EU single market. EU. Western Balkan leaders attended the inaugural summit of a new European Political Community in Prague in October, envisioned by French President Emmanuel Macron.
This commitment must continue.
Second, highlight the benefits of membership and participation.
The EU must reshape its cumbersome accession process to distribute more financial benefits and market access from the start, as candidates progress through reform. At present, they only receive pre-accession aid in dribs and drabs until they join.
The EU should invite ministers from the region to attend informal council meetings on issues of common interest. It should encourage Western Balkan countries to elect observers to the European Parliament at the same time as the 2024 European elections, so that they have a voice, or even a vote, in the making of EU laws.
Of course, the bulk of the work must be done in the candidate countries, most of which fall far short of meeting the basic conditions of democracy, rule of law, freedom of expression and the fight against corruption for membership.
As always, it’s a chicken and egg problem. Why would Balkan politicians undertake painful reforms that could loosen their grip on power and money in such a distant and uncertain perspective? The EU will need to work harder from the bottom, supporting civil society, women’s organizations and small businesses as drivers of change, while providing incentives and applying pressure from the top.
In these geopolitical times, the EU simply cannot afford to let the region fester.
