During her final visit in the Western Balkans As German Chancellor, Angela Merkel worked to reassure the region’s populations that her successor would be just as committed to the Western Balkans and their future as she had been.
Many citizens and politicians in the region admire Merkel for her leadership style and view Berlin as a trustworthy actor. Germany under Merkel has played a crucial role in pushing forward milestones such as the start of the Kosovo-Serbia negotiations process and the Berlin Process – an initiative that aims to encourage regional leaders to cooperate as They are getting closer to joining the EU. Germany also played a crucial role in stopping a land swap deal between Serbia and Kosovo, backed by former EU high representative Federica Mogherini. And on the crucial question of EU membership, during her recent visit, the outgoing Chancellor tried to say that “there is an absolute geostrategic interest for us to actually accept these countries into the Union European”. She further suggested that the void left by the Europeans would be filled by other influences in the region, mainly referring to China and Russia.
Progress towards EU membership has been slow for these countries, which no doubt partly explains the region’s recent democratic backsliding. Populist nationalism is now a powerful force that, combined with the absence of functional checks and balances, has created new political and security risks for the region. Identity demands are deployed in the service of political projects and ideas that threaten democracy and aim to modify demography through ethnic homogenization. These range from the idea of Srpski svet – the Serbian world; electoral manipulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Proposals to change the border between Kosovo and Serbia, supported at different times by the leaders of both countries, corruption, organized crime and emigration have increased. Citizens of the Western Balkans are increasingly losing confidence in their country’s membership in the EU.
The risks for the EU are considerable. Any increased flourishing of nationalist and illiberal leaders in the region could, at some point, cause a slide toward ethnic violence. This year alone, the region witnessed the celebration of a Serbian “Unity Day,” a new event during which Serbs in the Western Balkans are called upon to display the national flag. During a dispute over license plates with Kosovo, Serbia massed its army on the border with Kosovo and sent military planes into Kosovo’s airspace, warning that it would intervene within hours to “protect” the Kosovo Serbs if NATO – present in Kosovo in the form of KFOR – did not respond within 24 hours. And in Montenegro, the political influence of foreign state and non-state actors – mainly from Serbia, Russia, their churches and right-wing political organizations – has grown to such an extent that it threatens the stability of the country and region.
Berlin should take recent reports that Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi favors Serbia’s EU candidacy over other Western Balkan states.
In this context, it would be a strategic error for Germany and the EU to allow this to continue. The new German government therefore has a unique opportunity to actively work with countries and citizens in the region, as well as other EU member states, to bring the region closer to the EU. The results of September’s federal elections are promising in this regard: on the one hand, the emerging three-party coalition will not be overshadowed by the European People’s Party as the Christian Democrats and Merkel have been. The EPP made them more hesitant to oppose rising illiberal democracies in Europe, such as Hungary, whose ruling Fidesz party was a member of the EPP alongside Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s party and the VMRO-DPMNE party. of North Macedonia.
Indeed, although European policy was not a major theme during the German electoral campaign, the SPD chancellor candidate, Olaf Scholz, affirmed during a televised debate that his first trip abroad would be to Paris. One of Merkel’s main failures was her inability to convince the French president to further support regional enlargement. On the contrary, Macron has ended up being the main obstacle in recent years to greater integration of the Balkans into the EU. Scholz knows the importance of working closely with France to promote the strengthening of the internal cohesion of the EU. Green chancellor candidate Annalena Baerbock gave a similar answer when asked which capital she would visit first: her answer was Brussels.
The new German government should therefore actively work towards political consensus with other member states to find ways to integrate the region and reduce external influences from China and Russia. Although multilateral in nature, the Berlin Process is a format that Germany can play an important role in supporting, and it should expand its activities beyond infrastructure projects. The new coalition in Germany could also start by pushing at the level of member states and the European Commission for the six Western Balkan countries to be treated equally. Berlin should take recent reports that Enlargement Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi favors Serbia’s EU candidacy over others and downplays democracy concerns. He should push for the commission to investigate this issue and broader accountability as a collective body. The EU enlargement process is too important for the region to be left in the hands of an Orban appointee who is trying to undermine the EU from within.
For the Western Balkan countries, it is important that all three potential governing parties appear to support their integration into the EU. The parties hold human rights and democratic practices in high esteem and are supportive of NATO and transatlantic cooperation. All three are more hawkish when it comes to confronting China’s growing influence, and at least two out of three are unsympathetic toward Russia, which has often played the role of outside actor. destructive by obstructing the integration of the Balkans into the EU and NATO. The Greens in particular are relatively hostile to Moscow and harsh on Nord Stream 2, arguing that its construction would strengthen Russia’s authoritarian regime. It is vital that the new coalition recognizes the dangers that exist along the EU’s borders and lives up to the assurance of Germany’s continued interest suggested by Merkel just before the election.
The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take a collective position. ECFR publications represent solely the opinions of their individual authors.
