The reforms required of EU candidate states to secure their membership are only half the equation for a sustainably enlarged bloc. With the possible arrival of ten members – each with veto power – on the horizon, the EU must undertake its own reforms.
The 27 member states of the European Union today only seem to agree on the scale of the crises they face. From relocating migrants to responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, member states disagree on what to expect from individual countries and the bloc as a whole.
One of the few points of consensus to emerge following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is that EU enlargement is imperative for the stability of the continent. The promise of future EU membership has been one of the bloc’s favorite carrots in negotiations with its neighbors, but after decades of stagnation and apathy towards enlargement, that promise has started to lose credibility.
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, three countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Ukraine – have been granted candidate status, while Georgia and Kosovo have applied for membership. The long-pending accession processes of North Macedonia and Albania have been given new life with negotiations finally opening, and EU leaders have promised another long-standing candidate, Serbia, to accelerate its accession if it normalizes its relations with Kosovo.
“As we prepare the EU’s next strategic agenda, we must set a clear objective. I believe we must be ready – on both sides – for enlargement by 2030.” said European Council President Charles Michel at the Strategic Forum in Bled, Slovenia this year. “It’s ambitious, but necessary. This shows that we are serious.
But now that the Balkan countries are pursuing the reforms desired by the EU for almost two decades, it is the EU itself that does not seem ready to face the realities of enlargement and post-enlargement. .
Making decisions about decision making
Decisions regarding security and foreign policy, enlargement, institutional reform and the EU treaties currently require unanimity.
Article seven of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) – which allows for the suspension of members’ rights in the event of a serious and persistent violation of EU values, including the rule of law – requires unanimity less one to be activated. Because unanimity minus one is a difficult threshold to reach, de facto Alternative means of sanctioning the decline of the rule of law have developed, notably the conditioning of budgetary funds.
Against a backdrop of increasing polarization and politicization of European politics by populist movements within many member states, achieving unanimity on controversial policy issues has proven extremely difficult. Decisions are often blocked by vetoes related to other negotiations rather than the immediate issue.
Today there are 27 players with veto power over these crucial decisions, but if all the EU candidates – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia , Turkey and Ukraine – and potential candidates from Georgia and Kosovo were admitted, this number would increase. at 37. With so many actors capable of holding decisions hostage for concessions – including pairs of countries with radically divergent, even antagonistic, foreign policies, such as Kosovo and Serbia – the EU could become even more paralyzed .
“More members will mean more diversity,” Michel said. “We will need to adapt our institutional framework and procedures, so that an enlarged EU is able to take effective and timely decisions. »
Other policy decisions, such as those on migration and asylum, require a qualified majority of 55 percent of member states, currently 15 out of 27, representing at least 65 percent of the EU’s total population. If admitted into the current system, candidates from Ukraine – with a pre-war population of more than 43 million – and Turkey – with around 84 million – would shift the balance of power in the within the EU to become one of the most influential states in the Union.
Facing a post-enlargement reality
With EU enlargement back on the agenda, member states are scrambling to determine what enlargement would mean for the allocation of seats in the European Parliament, the bloc’s budget and the making of policies. general policies.
The French and German governments have tasked 12 non-governmental experts from European institutions to determine how to prepare the EU for enlargement while improving its capacity for action, protecting the rule of law, strengthening democracy and preserving fundamental European values. Their reportreleased in September, presents a comprehensive set of recommended reforms.
“Whether it concerns the management of health, energy, migration or financial crises, the EU has acted by invoking emergency powers or resorted to intergovernmental arrangements for lack of European instruments,” observes the report. “While ad hoc If these approaches were justified by time constraints, the EU should learn from multiple crises to refine its structure so that it can take effective measures within the EU framework, ultimately allowing for more democratic deliberation and control .
The report suggests that the EU replaces unanimity with qualified majority voting (QMV) on all political issues – even if they are not constitutional – and lowers the sanction threshold for rule of law violations to four fifths. However, it also suggests that member states should be given the opportunity to opt out of policy areas transferred to QMV and that the calculation of QMV shares be recalculated from 55 percent of members representing 65 percent of the EU population to , perhaps, 60 percent. percent of members representing 60 percent of the population.
In its current de facto state, fiscal conditionality is limited by the need to demonstrate a direct link between rule of law concerns and poor financial management. The report recommends codifying it in a de jure text instrument for sanctioning violations of the rule of law and other behavior detrimental to the sound financial management of the European budget.
In order to financially prepare for enlargement by 2030, the report recommends increasing the EU budget in the next budgetary period, both in nominal terms and in relation to gross domestic product, as well as allowing the Union to issue joint debt in the future.
Differentiated integration has long been used to allow, internally, certain member states to withdraw from certain forms of integration, such as membership of the monetary union, and externally, to allow non-member states to the EU to participate in individual policies, such as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. join the Schengen area.
The report proposes differentiation within EU frameworks to dissolve blockages, and as many of the reforms discussed would require treaty revisions, potentially reluctant states could be offered opt-outs in the new treaty to allow other countries to move towards deeper integration.
The report ultimately envisages four levels of European integration: the restricted circle of States of the Schengen area and the euro zone; the whole EU – united in common values and in access to cohesion funds and redistribution policies; associate members – primarily European Economic Area (EEA) states that are fundamentally aligned with EU values but choose not to pursue closer political integration; and the European Political Community, including countries like Azerbaijan that are beyond the single market and EU values but have converging geopolitical interests.
Maintaining momentum in the Balkans
However, none of these grandiose reforms will happen overnight. As the Balkans fear their accession talks will never end – made worse by the suspension of negotiations with Turkey – the EU must find new ways to keep motivated candidates who have been lining up for decades while Brussels puts order in his own house.
None of the Western Balkan candidates are members of the EEA. However, a report published by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) last month suggests that the Union could buy time to carry out its own reforms while maintaining the commitment of its Balkan partners by pushing ahead with its trade agreements. existing stabilization and association towards a customs union.
The EU’s association agreements with countries in Central and Southeast Europe have also served as de facto pre-accession instruments, and the report suggests that expanding those with Western Balkan states would deepen the coordination of economic policies by giving these countries a greater voice in the development of decisions related to free trade. and movement.
Excessive expansion could lead to a permanent structural inability to harmonize national interests into a common European interest. But even if enlargement never happens, the EU will still face growing pressure from populists to dismantle Brussels’ heavy technocratic bureaucracy in the name of national sovereignty and return to a purely economic community.
Reforming the EU’s decision-making processes helps avoid both by improving the quality of its democratic governance while ensuring the sustainability of enlargement – but the EU cannot continue to delay accession indefinitely of its enthusiastic candidates.
Unlike many news and information platforms, Emerging Europe is free to read and always will be. There is no paywall here. We are independent and do not affiliate with or represent any political party or commercial organization. We want the best for emerging Europe, no more, no less. Your support will help us continue to raise awareness of this magnificent region.
You can contribute here. THANKS.
