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On November 8, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, officially recommended that Ukraine and Moldova will soon open accession negotiations with Brussels, subject to meeting certain criteria. This decision is both an expression of commitment to Ukraine and a kick-off in the direction of Russia. Indeed, EU officials are betting that by anchoring Eastern European countries – Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the Western Balkans and possibly Georgia – even more firmly in the EU, they will be able to get them out of the precarious no-man’s land between the EU and Russia, and thus stabilize the EU’s eastern borders. The best way to increase the peace and prosperity of Europeans, according to von der Leyen, is to lock all liberal-minded states, from the Baltic countries to the Balkans, into the institutions and structures of democratic Europe. “Enlargement is a vital policy for the European Union,” she said. “To complete our union is the call of history. …We all win.
On November 8, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, officially recommended that Ukraine and Moldova will soon open accession negotiations with Brussels, subject to meeting certain criteria. This decision is both an expression of commitment to Ukraine and a kick-off in the direction of Russia. Indeed, EU officials are betting that by anchoring Eastern European countries – Ukraine and Moldova, as well as the Western Balkans and possibly Georgia – even more firmly in the EU, they will be able to get them out of the precarious no-man’s land between the EU and Russia, and thus stabilize the EU’s eastern borders. The best way to increase the peace and prosperity of Europeans, according to von der Leyen, is to lock all liberal-minded states, from the Baltic countries to the Balkans, into the institutions and structures of democratic Europe. “Enlargement is a vital policy for the European Union,” she said. “To complete our union is the call of history. …We all win.
But this strategy could backfire if Brussels proves to be as unequal as in the Western Balkans, where the enlargement process has on earth for 20 years– and even sparked a backlash in countries frustrated and disappointed by broken promises despite many years of imperfect but hard-won reforms. These unfortunate countries not only remain outside the EU, but some are led by domestic populists who are moving in the opposite direction and forging alliances with the EU’s geopolitical rivals, including Russia and Turkey. Given the complexity of the integration of countries like Ukraine and Moldova, it is easy to imagine them receiving the same treatment from the EU – and eliciting the same type of reaction in response.
In the early 2000s, the EU opened the enlargement process to all Western Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. But two decades later, only Croatia has joined – the fault lies both with the candidate countries and with the EU itself. A series of internal problems and bilateral conflicts between the countries have prevented them from fulfilling all the obligations of membership, including standards of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Serbia has long faced rule of law and corruption problems, which have worsened after initially improving, and its strained relations with Kosovo further complicate its status. In the same way, Kosovo faces Serbia which blocks its path, as well as the fact that several EU states refuse to recognize its independence. Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly unstablethe post-war peace accords having divided a country which essentially observes peace but fails to move forward with reforms.
The fact that Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia are basically Ready to go– and has been doing so for years now – shows that much of the problem lies within the EU itself. After accepting Romania, Bulgaria (2007) and Croatia (2013), many member states expressed “enlargement fatigue” and believed that consolidation, not enlargement, was in order. agenda – notably France, Denmark and the Netherlands. Of course, in light of the nightmare of EU trials against authoritarian regimes Poland And Hungary, which has put obstacles in the way of its functioning, all EU countries are wary of new members whose unequal democratic credentials could lead them to do the same. Enlargement is not a popular position either: in France and Germany, only 35 percent and 42 percent of those questioned, respectively, want enlargement. In Austria, only 29 percent. Rubbing salt into the wounds, French President Emmanuel Macron called for a European political community for like-minded non-EU states that do not meet the membership criteria (and for any interested EU countries) – a sort of purgatory for the losing nations.
The lack of a clear path or concrete timetable has paralyzed the momentum of demanding reforms and, in some countries, even reversed them. Many Western Balkan countries now have powerful political forces among them that view the EU as hypocritical and its criteria as counterproductive. Loss of momentum in favor of membership has initiated a vicious circle, argued a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, he said: “Stalled reform efforts are contributing to slowing economic growth, which in turn justifies skepticism within the European Union regarding future enlargement. With membership being a distant or unattainable prospect, public attention and political attention (in the Balkans) are shifting to other areas, making it more difficult to justify the policies needed to align with membership. acquired from the EU. Thus, more political space is created for populist candidates or for political leaders to meet the needs of the EU’s competitors, such as China or Russia.”
Today, the region is plagued by the detritus of the EU’s failures. There is no better example than Serbia, which applied to join the EU in 2009 and has been a candidate for membership since 2012 – languishing in the waiting room, as it is called. Reforms according to Community acquis took a leap forward and then fell back. While some critics attribute this to Serbs’ lack of effort and their illiberal political culture, others say the complex country would have fared much better with a firmer helping hand from Brussels.
Since 2017, right-wing nationalist Aleksandar Vucic, a former ally of former Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic, has been president, a position from which he once pledged to ally himself with the EU reform process and then praised Russian President Vladimir Putin the next day. Although Serbia today is a different animal than 20 years ago, largely due to EU processes, it has been slow to undertake difficult reforms aimed at combating organized crime, violations of the rule of law, corruption and judicial independence. This year, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Vucic said, with words that almost any regional leader could utter: “We are not as enthusiastic as before, in the same way that the European Union is not as enthusiastic about us as we thought. » He said he was “pessimistic” about Serbia’s upcoming entry into the EU.
Belgrade’s disillusionment has made it open to Russia’s overtures. Moscow strengthens radical nationalist parties and the Orthodox Church, as well as Milorad Dodik, the former Serbian nationalist co-president of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Geopolitically, Serbia undermined the wartime Euro-Atlantic sanctions regime against Russia. Not only does it refuse to implement trade and financial sanctions, but it imports Russian natural gas. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation is much the same.
Why the EU took this monumental step with Ukraine and Moldova makes sense on several levels. Ukraine has staked its very existence on its identification as a liberal democracy; Ultimately, this is the main reason behind Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attack on Ukraine and his unwillingness to concede. A true democracy aligned with Western Europe rather than Russia undermines the illiberal and authoritarian state aspect that Russia and its satellites embody and want to perpetuate. Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity in 2014 and the tenacious defense of its territory since the Russian invasion in 2022 underscore how serious Ukraine is in its commitment to becoming a Western-style democracy. And this effort has been recognized by the Euro-Atlantic alliance in the form of military and humanitarian aid, international diplomatic engagement and, in June 2022, the price of EU candidate status.
But Ukraine and Moldova will soon have to embark on the tough economic reforms the EU demands – and face the challenge of doing so in wartime. “This is why the European Commission cannot manage Ukraine’s accession process in the same way for the Western Balkans,” said Vessela Tcherneva of the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank. “As a country at war, Ukraine’s membership must contain a bold and coherent political message and greater funding linked to its reconstruction. »
This recipe must also apply to the Western Balkans, because the EU cannot let the situation fester while granting benefits and revamped processes to Ukraine and Moldova. The EU has not yet lost the Western Balkans, but it could do so if it does not make amends now. This would mean, among other things, increasing EU pre-accession funds and providing early access to certain policy areas. Most experts agree that a peaceful Ukraine and fully supported by Brussels could make a difference. It is essential that reform-minded Ukrainian politicians can convince citizens that the hard work to achieve this is worth it.
Correction, November 17, 2023: A previous version of this article incorrectly stated the length of Aleksandar Vucic’s presidency.
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